Sherlock Holmes Codes the Social Body

Rosemary Jann

SHERLOCK HOLMES CODES THE SOCIAL BODY

BY ROSEMARY JANN

"It is my business to know things. That is my trade."1

The persistent appeal of the Sherlock Holmes stories owes much to his all but invincible accuracy in recognizing which facts are clues and in forcing them to tell their tales. Many critics have followed Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's biographer Pierre Nordon in viewing Holmes as a resonant symbol of the late Victorian faith in the power of logic and rationality to insure order, but fewer have focused on the narrative manipulation necessary to guarantee his positivistic triumphs.2 Although Sherlock Holmes claims that "guessing" is a "shocking habit—destructive to the logical faculty" (SIGN, 93), the familiar pattern whereby he identifies the traces of crime and evaluates their relationship in fact rests on the constant informed guessing of hypothesis formation and testing. The contributors to The Sign of Three amply demonstrate that Holmes's logic is patterned less on induction or deduction than on what Charles Peirce defined as abduction and Holmes calls "analytic" reasoning (STUD, 83): moving backwards from an effect to hypothesis about the situation(s) that could have caused it.3 Unlike Peirce, however, Holmes seldom tests the logical validity of his abductions; as Marcello Truzzi points out, Holmes's apparent wizardry rests largely on the fact that Doyle has simply arranged the plots so that the detective either guesses correctly the first time, or easily eliminates alternative hypotheses.4 The "logical" solution has been created in order to be discovered; the "facts" are allowed to tell only one tale.

Holmes also differs from Peirce by stressing not the originality and creativity of abduction, but its close conformity to recognized codes and laws. An important effect of Doyle's fictional project is to reassure readers of the reliability of such codes and to render logical the social order that they imply. Holmes's conclusions are "elementary" (CROO, 412) because his method is nothing "but systematized common sense" (BLAN, 1011). Doyle reinforces this view by having Watson repeatedly admit how "ridiculously simple" (SCAN, 162) is Holmes's reasoning once explained (e.g.,
DANC, 511). Holmes’s investigations relentlessly transform what might be merely “subjective” guesses into “objective” facts (SUSS, 1042) and thus reaffirm the transparency of his logic and the “common sense” assumptions it is based upon.⁵

The myth of rationality that Doyle constructs in the Holmes stories relies heavily on the posited but seldom tested validity of indexical codes of body and behavior that allow Holmes infallibly to deduce character and predict actions from gesture and appearance. Doyle modeled Holmes’s method on that used by his professor at the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, Dr. Joseph Bell, for diagnosing not just his patients’ medical ills but also their recent or habitual behavior.⁶ Linking such “symptoms” to Freudian slips and the trademark techniques of particular artists, Carlo Ginzburg has underlined the importance of their being unconscious and difficult to dissemble, so that the body can’t help but betray its secrets to the “scientific” specialist.⁷ Holmes “claimed by a momentary expression, a twitch of a muscle or a glance of an eye, to fathom a man’s inmost thoughts. Deceit, according to him, was an impossibility in the case of one trained to observation and analysis” (STUD, 23). He is constantly searching for “traces of . . . individuality” (SIGN, 112), but these are interpretable precisely because they can always be referred to quite deterministic codes of class, gender, and ethnicity that are always already there to render true “individuality” an illusion; Holmes “never make[s] exceptions. An exception disproves the rule” (SIGN, 96). What Allan Sekula suggests about nineteenth-century physiognomy and phrenology is equally true of the more elaborate typologies based upon them in the Holmes stories: they create the distinctions that they purport to observe, in effect constructing categories of the normative while appearing merely to interpret them. Such typologies can be seen as playing an important part in the increasing specification of individuality that for Michel Foucault is directly proportional to the social control exercised in modern disciplinary systems; as power becomes more anonymous, those most subject to it become less so—they are in effect controlled by having all aspects of their identities subject to surveillance and measured against posited norms of behavior. By being able to reduce even the most bizarre details to their proper place in such typologies, Holmes helps enforce the fixity and naturalness of the social ordering that rests upon them. The effect of his “trade” in “facts” is to protect social order by a continual reiteration of nor-
malcy. As D. A. Miller puts it, the detective's "super vision" creates "the prospect of an absolute surveillance under which everything would be known, incriminated, policed."8

It is important to note that it is not just the criminal body, but the entire social body that must be coded in the Holmes adventures. Since discipline, as Foucault points out, "individualizes bodies" not by a fixed position but by their relative position in a ranked order, a network of relations through which they circulate (Discipline and Punish, 145-46). If we accept Sekula's formulation of the two major models for criminal investigation in the late nineteenth century—one focused on the specification of the characteristic criminal body, the other on identifying the actual bodies of specific criminals guilty of specific crimes (18)—we can see that Doyle in effect applies both models to the entire social order. The "individuation" of clients and criminals is equally subject to specifying codes, codes that in turn assume the existence of fixed behavioral types. Everyone in the Holmes universe becomes Foucault's "calculable man" (Discipline and Punish, 193).

My main objective in examining the sources and elaboration of such codes in the Holmes canon is to consider Doyle's use of various nineteenth-century typologies to give "scientific" support to a particular social order and to focus on instabilities in the classification of class and gender that betray Doyle's ideological investments. Catherine Belsey, following Pierre Macherey, has noted the ways feminine sexuality eludes the rational solution of mystery promised by the Holmes stories; my concern lies more with evasions of coding that similarly expose the incompleteness of Doyle's positivistic enterprise.9 Although in theory the order of the Holm-esian universe rests on the inescapable typing of all classes, in practice the upper classes are more likely to elude the determinism of such typing, just as they more successfully resist the exposure of their secrets and escape the penalties of the criminal justice system. Holmes's purported success at assuming new personalities through disguise (BLAC, 559) is the best example of this evasion; it exposes the artificiality of such codes—for how can behavior so presumably natural be so easily counterfeited?—and in the process makes clear the unequal subordination to social control that ideology wishes to conceal.

"Data! data! data!" he cried impatiently. "I can't make bricks without clay." (COPP, 322)
Sherlock Holmes's "extraordinary genius for minutiae" (SIGN, 91) and his insistence that a "cold and unemotional manner" alone can make detection an "exact science" (SIGN, 90) are presented as the most prominent traits of his character. And yet notwithstanding his frequent cautions against theorizing without data (e.g., STUD, 27; VALL, 779; DEVI, 960), Holmes does not really follow "docilely wherever fact may lead" (REIG, 407). He may not be misled by social "prejudices" (REIG, 407), but he sees clues others miss precisely because he is looking for them, because he has already formed a hypothesis that predicts the relevant evidence (SILV, 343). When chided by dull-witted police inspectors for being carried away by "mere" theories (SIGN, 113; BOSC, 213), he always turns out to be correct. He insists that an impersonal and inflexible logic guarantees the correctness of his "déductions" (COPP, 317; SPEC, 258), but he is actually able to mold the "clay" of facts correctly every time because Doyle has already determined the shape of the brick. His dazzling successes in apparently reading Watson's mind (DANC, 511; CARD, 888-90) are only the most obvious instances in which Holmes pulls off feats of deduction because Doyle has artificially limited the range of possible interpretations of behavior, making what is only possible seem inevitable. Doyle perhaps unconsciously admits as much by having Holmes chide Watson for achieving "meretricious" effects by withholding "some factors in the problem which are never imparted to the reader" (CROO, 412) until the case is complete, although of course Holmes himself encourages just such effects by concealing all details of his solutions until they have been vindicated (VALL, 787).

Moreover, despite Holmes's assertions that logic and imagination are incompatible (EMPT, 495), it is "the scientific use of the imagination" that allows him to "balance probabilities and choose the most likely" (HOUN, 687). Many of his solutions depend, like his mind-reading, upon his ability to imagine what others would have done or thought under particular circumstances. Inspector Gregory in "Silver Blaze" and Officer Lestrade in "Norwood Builder" fail not because they lack logic, but because they are too vulgarly commonsensical. They lack the comprehensive grasp of human experience that presumably allows Holmes to imagine how a suspect behaved (SILV, 344; NORW, 501). "You know my methods" he reminds Watson in "The Musgrave Ritual":

688  Sherlock Holmes and Social Coding
I put myself in the man’s place, and, having first gauged his intelligence, I try to imagine how I should myself have proceeded under the same circumstances. In this case the matter was simplified by Brunton’s intelligence being quite first-rate, so that it was unnecessary to make any allowance for the personal equation, as the astronomers have dubbed it. (395)

As these remarks suggest, Holmes’s “imagination” is guided by the thorough predictability of human behavior, a predictability that depends on all forms of behavior being as easily quantified, classified, and comparatively ranked as intelligence is here. A client can be treated as “a mere unit, a factor in a problem” (SIGN, 96), because the laws of human behavior are as regular as the “propositions of Euclid” (STUD, 23). Holmes cites the late-Victorian rationalist Winwood Reade as his authority for claiming that “while the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty” (SIGN, 137), his actions predictable by statistical probabilities. Because in crime, as in all other forms of human endeavor, there is “nothing new under the sun” (STUD, 29), Holmes can rely on earlier criminal cases to guide him in present ones (e.g. REDH, 176–77). Similarly, Holmes is able to solve the riddles of individuality by referring details back to codes that reliably interpret them. Standing behind such codes is that staple of late-Victorian materialism, the deterministic order of the “great chain” of life, a vision of nature in which interconnectedness insures the fixed position of each part (STUD, 23). To the logician, a drop of water implies the Atlantic (STUD, 23); to the “ideal reasoner,” a single fact betrays the template of actions that formed it as inevitably and naturally as a single bone leads a Cuvier back to the only species to which it could have belonged (FIVE, 225).

To perfect his art, of course, the “ideal reasoner” must be able to command a virtually encyclopedic knowledge. Hence, Holmes is constantly “docketing” (SIXN, 587; SUSS, 1035) information for future reference either mentally (LION, 1090) or literally in his voluminous indexes (BRUC, 913). Not surprisingly, he professes himself an enthusiastic admirer of Alphonse Bertillon (NAVA, 460), the French criminologist who kept indexes of physical measurements by which he hoped to specify the “characteristic elements of individuality” that would infallibly identify criminal offenders.10 According to Dr. James Mortimer, however, as a “practical man of affairs” Holmes knows how to employ his scientific precision more
productively than Bertillon (HOUN, 672–73); for the "practical" agent of social order, facts are presumably not ends in themselves but the means to control others. Holmes, like his brother Mycroft, has a brain like a great storehouse of apparently miscellaneous and irrelevant facts, available for the moment when by retrieving and then "focusing" them, he will reveal them to be parts of a pre-existing system of meaning waiting to be discovered and utilized to solve crimes, or in Mycroft's case, to determine national policy (BRUC, 914; LION, 1090). Massimo Bonfantini and Giampaolo Proni are surely correct in arguing that the detective is engaged not in hermeneutics but in puzzle solving, seeking the one correct answer from a finite and predetermined set of clue-fitting possibilities. 11 Holmes shares with Watson a "love of all that is bizarre and outside the conventions and humdrum routine of everyday life" (REDH, 176) not just because the grotesque is so often linked to the criminal (WIST, 869), but because such details, by demanding explanation, lead the "scientific" analyst (HOUN, 764) most directly to the deeper conventions of behavior according to which they are no longer bizarre. 12 Nothing is "so unnatural as the commonplace" (IDEN, 191) because it is too featureless to be coded. The "colourless, uneventful case" alone is hopeless (SHOS, 1108) because its details offer no contrast or difference by which they can be assigned a place in a system of meaning. Holmes's success in making "trifles" (BOSC, 214) reveal essences rests on the fact that he is presumed to be detecting a natural and transcendent order whose determinism is so all-embracing that even the smallest details signify the whole.

"How do you know?" "I saw their traces." (RESI, 432)

Doyle helped create the tradition of the detective distinguished by his skill at reading the signs the body involuntarily leaves behind. Criminals, Holmes assures Watson, always create "some indentation, some abrasion, some trifling displacement" of the environment that the "scientific searcher" can discover (BLAC, 562): footprints betray their maker's height, bloodstains his physical type, fingerprints his unique identity (STUD, 33, 85; NORW, 506). But every body, criminal or client, unwittingly gives and receives marks that make its "personality" (BOSC, 214) subject to moral as well as physical appraisal. Holmes's abilities go far beyond the simple grasp of correspondences by which disordered dress always betrays disordered minds (e.g., IDEN, 192; DEVI, 956); he as-
tounds Watson as much by reading the signs of individuality left on pipes, watches, and bootlaces (YELL, 352) as he does by reading minds: indeed, for Holmes it is virtually the same act. Watson's family watch reveals to Holmes the drunkenness and poverty of his brother, and Henry Baker's hat not just his age and hair color but his foresight, his impoverishment, his moral decline, and his estrangement from his wife (SIGN, 92; BLUE, 246-47). For Holmes, objects submit themselves to natural ranking as readily as people; by mastering all possible classifications of cigar ashes, typefaces, bicycle tires, and perfumes, he can force these objects to collaborate in his further specification of the individuals who use them (STUD, 33; HOUN, 686; PRIO, 547; HOUN, 765).

In addition to participating in an inherent ordering, objects are also important for the way they mark bodies in distinguishing ways, as mud marks the left arm of one riding in a dog cart (SPEC, 259) or a peddle marks the cyclist's shoe (SOLI, 527). It is not just conventional behavior—the sailor's rum drinking or the sporting talk of the breeder (BLAC, 371; GLOR, 389) that Doyle uses to type people, but their very bodies. The weaver's tooth, the compositor's thumb (COPP, 317), the different hands formed by cutting cork, laying slate, and polishing diamonds (SIGN, 91), all demonstrate the internalization of labor by the worker's body. And yet Holmes's sweeping claim that a man's calling is "plainly revealed" by his fingernails, callouses, and the state of his clothing (STUD, 23) is clearly much truer of the working than of the middle and upper classes. Where the lower classes are classified indelibly by their collisions with the world of objects, higher classes are marked from the inside out, not by what they have done but by what they "are." The essence of their moral and intellectual identities is inscribed in their faces, heads, and the bearing of their bodies.

This privileging of higher, less material expression over the lower, more physical body has affinities with what Peter Stallybrass and Allon White characterize as a common tactic in the late Victorian "politics of transgression": the projection of bodily functions onto the working classes and the dark nether world in which they lived—the same nether world Holmes must so often explore in the pursuit of crime. Doyle's use of such a tactic suggests that the naturalizing of class difference wins out over his desire to submit the entire social body to a uniform degree of coding. This reading of the body politic also reflects in some respects methods applied in the early nineteenth-century French phystologies—those hand-

Rosemary Jann 691
books of description and illustration which, according to Walter Benjamin, assured people threatened by the anonymity of the modern city that the profession, life style, and moral character of strangers could be read by external signs. As such methods were later developed by writers like Poe and caricaturists like Honore Daumier and Henry Monnier, however, the bourgeois was just as easily stereotyped as the worker, whereas Doyle subjects only the lower classes to such strict predictability. The effect of most of Doyle's codings is to define all Others by their deviation from a natural unmarked self that was male, British, and at least bourgeois.¹⁵

In these codings of others, Doyle relies upon the authority of a variety of Victorian strategies for demonstrating the physical bases of difference. Watson assumes and Holmes endorses virtually every scientific and pseudoscientific system of bodily signs available in the nineteenth century, with the usual effect of blurring the line between the voluntarily or culturally influenced and the biologically programmed. Holmes advocates the kind of hereditary determinism common in the late nineteenth century, solving “The Adventure of the Cardboard Box” by detecting a family resemblance in the ears of victim and client, for instance, or realizing that Stapleton must be a Baskerville by his resemblance to the portrait of the evil Sir Hugo (CARD, 896, HOUN, 750). More importantly, moral traits are considered similarly inheritable, so that the abnormal cruelty of a child can incriminate his parents in “The Copper Beeches” (330). Holmes's theory that “the individual represents in his development the whole procession of his ancestors, and that such a sudden turn to good or evil stands for some strong influence which came into the line of his pedigree” (EMPT, 494) is employed most usefully to explain the criminal “stain” in men like Moriarty (FINA, 470–71) or his second in command, Moran (EMPT, 494). But for Holmes as well, the artist's blood that he shares with Mycroft plays a larger role in accounting for their shared genius in detection than does the training each has received (GREE, 435). Of course, the alleged biological determinism of that genius deflects no credit from Holmes, any more than the inherited criminality of Moriarty and Moran absolves them from moral responsibility for their crimes.¹⁶ Biology may be destiny, but free will remains the foundation for moral judgment in Doyle's world.

Doyle's similar reliance on ethnic stereotyping reflects the widespread interest in “racial” differences in late Victorian science.¹⁷ Some kinds of cultural signs are strictly conventional, like the let-

692  *Sherlock Holmes and Social Coding*
ters printed by Germans (STUD, 33), the calls by which Australians communicate (BOSC, 213), or the blowpipes, tropical snakes, and other exotic artifacts that so often lead Holmes to the guilty. But bodies betray “racial” essences as well, in their feet (SIGN, 127), but more often in their typically African (YELL, 361), Greek (GREE, 438), Italian (NAVA, 449), Old English (DANC, 513) or Sussex (LION, 1085) faces. In the later and less inspired stories, such ethnic stereotyping hardens into a prop, whereby deviance from the English “type” invariably signals criminal propensities. The most common sign of the “strange, outlandish blood” (LION, 1084) that conduces to violence is dark skin, which signals the “tropical” imbalance of the Tiger of San Pedro (WIST, 884) and of several South American wives (SUSS, 1038; THOR, 1066), the “almost Oriental” depravity of the Baron Gruner (ILLU, 996), as well as the presumed inferiority of the American black (3GAB, 1023; but compare YELL, 361).

The logic behind such ethnic essentialism also informs Doyle’s class and criminal typologies: signs of moral and intellectual “nature” were indelibly inscribed on the surface of the body, and particularly on the face. Such assumptions were underpinned by still vigorous popular traditions of physiognomy and its related branches of pathognomy and phrenology, which gave varying degrees of quasi-scientific status to reading the face and head in the nineteenth century. Although Doyle does incorporate some references to phrenology—in the anthropometrical interests of James Mortimer (HOUN, 672) or in Moriarty’s surprise that Holmes lacks “frontal development” (FINA, 472), for instance—physiognomical conventions provided him a wider and more various range of possibilities for social coding. It is usually Watson’s “quick eye for faces” (RETI, 1116) that records and interprets their appearances, but Holmes and the occasional third person narrator clearly follow the same conventions (e.g., BLAN, 1001; MAZA, 1015–16). Holmes’s ability to read Watson’s mind rests largely on the validity of pathognomy, the reading of emotions from facial expression. In claiming that “the features are given to man as the means by which he shall express his emotions” (RESI, 423), Holmes leaves conveniently ambiguous the sanction for such correspondences: was the face, as Johann Caspar Lavater had claimed, shaped by God to reveal one’s moral state, or shaped by adaptation through the process of evolution, as Darwin’s 1872 The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals had argued. Either explanation renders
changes in facial expressions transparent and unambiguous when "scientifically" interpreted: Holmes easily determines whether contorted features signify guilt (RESI, 430), terror (DEVI, 957), agony (LION, 1084) or hatred (SUSS, 1043).

Physiognomical conventions were more important than pathognomical ones in determining character since they were presumably more permanent, while enjoying the same kind of sanction: Watson identifies the cruel mouth that disfigures Baron Gruner’s otherwise handsome face as “Nature’s danger-signal, set as a warning to his victims” (ILLU, 996). Holmes similarly identifies moral character with physical appearance when he pronounces Mortimer Trengennis’s “foxy face and small, shrewd, beady eyes” the signs of a particularly unforgiving disposition (DEVI, 966). This process of physiognomical correspondence is extended by Doyle to lend a quasi-biological justification to a whole range of bodily signs linked to class and gender. Although Holmes allows that “finesse” is usually the product of “higher education” (SIGN, 135), the distinction between acquired and innate traits is often ambiguous. Take handwriting, for instance. It seems plausible enough to detect in it the writer’s level of education (e.g., CARD, 891; CREE, 1073, 1082). But for Holmes it just as infallibly reveals traits less subject to conscious cultivation: strength or weakness of character, for instance (SIGN, 96; REIG, 407), or the writer’s gender (WIST, 874; CARD, 891; REDC, 906). “Bearing” presents similar problems. Former officers have a military “air” about them (STUD, 24), a certain “carriage” (STUD, 26) or “cut” of their figures (BLAN, 1000) or an “expression of authority” (GREE, 437) that infallibly reveals their profession to Holmes. These signs could perhaps result from an internalization of disciplinary training, not unlike the marks of trade on the worker’s body; but when one considers that many officers were still self-selected from the middle and upper classes, their air of authority could just as easily be the outward manifestation of an inward superiority.

For class has its own bearing and physiognomy; good “breeding,” as the term suggests, is a process of transmitting essences born in the blood and inscribed in face and body. It creates “exceedingly aristocratic” (MUSG, 388) as well as refined and cultured faces (3GAB, 1024), and gives gentlemen an unequivocal bearing (NORW, 497–98; HOUN, 685). John Scott Eccles provides the perfect alibi in “The Adventure of Wisteria Lodge,” for his features and manner mark him as “the very type of conventional
British respectability”; neither inspector dreams of questioning his extraordinary story (870, 876). For Doyle as for most later Victorians, however, true gentility required not just an accident of birth, but an inherent moral superiority. Doyle betrays the typical bourgeois suspicion of aristocratic decadence in having Watson characterize Lord Holdhurst as one of “that not too common type, a nobleman who is in truth noble” (NAVA, 459). Mary Morstan’s “spiritual” eyes give evidence of her “refined and sensitive nature” (SIGN, 94), notwithstanding her relative poverty, and the “innate nobility of character” in Grace Dunbar’s face convinces even the usually unsusceptible Holmes of the governess’s innocence, despite the weight of incriminating evidence against her (THOR, 1065–66). When a middle-class person is involved, Doyle usually endorses Watson’s conviction that previous evidence of “character” always “goes for something” in mitigating suspicion (BRUC, 922).

Such intangible signs of class refinement naturally outweigh more grossly physical signs or the marks of objects in determining status: Violet Smith, the “Solitary Cyclist,” has fingers that could belong to either a typist or a musician, but Holmes knows that the “spirituality” of her face is such that “the typewriter does not generate” (527). Similarly, Lord Mount-James has a manner that commands attention despite his shabby appearance (MISS, 626), and the “Creeping Man,” Professor Presbury, remains “dignified” even while under the influence of animal hormones (1081). The middle and upper classes have more control over physical signs in another sense as well; in that by convention they have more control over their bodies. Aristocrats constitute “a caste who do not lightly show emotion,” and seldom expose the “natural man” behind the “aristocratic mask” (SECO, 657, 652). Gentlemen may fly into rages, but are capable of reducing the “hot flame of anger” to “frigid” indifference by their “supreme self-command” (THOR, 1059), especially when confronted by Holmes’s even greater coolness and self-assurance (DEVI, 967; SHOS, 1111). Appearances can be deceiving, as Holmes reminds Watson (SIGN, 96), but it is almost always characters from the higher classes who successfully counterfeit themselves: it is the most outwardly respectable of the “Three Students” who proves guilty (600), and the “refined-looking” Neville St. Clair who disguises himself as the hideous “Man with the Twisted Lip” (242). Stapleton, the rogue Baskerville, is also able to elude Holmes through disguise (HOUN, 690).

The lower classes, on the other hand, are not only marked by
physical signs that cannot be concealed by behavior, but are also more easily read and manipulated by Holmes. Their secrets are as open to surveillance as their bodies. Whereas the upper classes are “naturally” reserved, the London message-boy cannot help telegraphing his state of mind through every twitch of his body (SIXN, 585). It is true that their very social negligibility (and that they are children) gives Holmes’s ragged crew of street arabs, the “Baker Street Irregulars,” access to information that would be withheld from “an official-looking person”; but it is also significant that their potentially subversive ability to “go everywhere and hear everything” is transformed by Holmes’s superior bourgeois “organization” into more useful “work”—that is, more effective social control—than the official police could produce (STUD, 42; see also SIGN, 127). Holmes similarly advises Watson that the village pub when properly exploited is always a more profitable source of specific information about locals than an official like the rental agent Watson consults in “The Adventure of the Solitary Cyclist” (532).

Holmes is, as Watson reports, “a past-master in the art of putting a humble witness at his ease,” and uses this “ease” to “extract” (MISS, 624) all relevant information from sacked employees and carefully “cultivated” village gossips (WIST, 879, 882), and inn-keepers (SHOS, 1108). The main objective in dealing with “people of that sort,” Holmes explains in “The Sign of Four,” is to prevent them from realizing the value of their information: “never... let them think that their information can be of the slightest importance to you. If you do they will instantly shut up like an oyster. If you listen to them under protest, as it were, you are very likely to get what you want” (124). Giving the witness a false sense of superiority by volunteering incorrect information also proves useful in eliciting correct descriptions from hotel clerks (HOUN, 692), and helps trick even the most hostile servant into admitting precisely what he or she wishes to conceal (e.g., 3GAB, 1026, 1031). Susceptibility to the same kind of ruse exposes “John Garridebs” as the common criminal, Killer Evans, rather than the more respectable Counselor at Law he pretends to be (3GAR, 1045, 1047), and cements the reader’s contempt for the suspiciously foreign and vulgar Count Sylvius in “The Adventure of the Mazarin Stone” (1015–16). Lower-class talk involuntarily incriminates “the humble” in this fictive world: even their anonymous confessions in the “agony
columns” of the local newspapers can be turned to profit against them by Holmes (e.g., REDC, 904).

Significantly, women are portrayed as more vulnerable than men to manipulation by Holmes. He possesses a “peculiarly ingratiating way with women”—particularly lower-class women—that readily establishes “terms of confidence with them” (GOLD, 617), as well as “an almost hypnotic power of soothing” them—that is, of making them feel at ease enough to reveal what he wants to know (REDC, 902). The malleability of women is in keeping with Doyle’s tendency to subject a much wider range of female (as opposed to male) behavior to typing. It is not just conventional stereotypes about women that Doyle exploits—their “pertinacity” and “cunning” (REDC, 901), for instance, or their greater capacity for hatred when spurned (ILLU, 990). Holmes cites gender as his authority for an implausibly specific array of female conduct: when a woman “oscillates” upon the pavement, it always means she has “an affaire de coeur” on her mind (IDEN, 192); when a woman is agitated, she demands her tea (CROO, 417); a devoted wife would let no one prevent her from viewing her husband’s dead body (VALL, 801); no woman would send a reply-paid telegram instead of coming herself (WIST, 870). The common thread in these examples seems to be the assumption that women in general (like the lower classes) have less control over their emotions. That assumption also underlies Holmes’s somewhat contradictory complaint that the “motives” of women are “inscrutable” precisely because they lack rationality: “Their most trivial action may mean volumes, or their most extraordinary conduct may depend upon a hairpin or a curling tong” (SECO, 657; see also ILLU, 988). Belsey argues that women’s sexuality, so often the motive behind Doyle’s plots but so seldom acknowledged or confronted, betrays by its very absence from the tales the gaps in the author’s pretensions to a scientific determinism that can account for all forms of behavior. A similar analysis could be applied to women’s lack of logic: it disrupts the predictability of “man in the aggregate,” upon which Holmes’s deductions depend. Doyle’s uneasiness with such exceptions to the rule is signaled in the strained plausibility of the “rules” for females in the aggregate that Holmes does come up with.

A closer examination of Doyle’s treatment of “women in general” suggests, however, that in actual practice, class and ethnicity have much the same predictive value as they do for men. The jealousy

Rosemary Jann

697
that is axiomatic in female nature is intensified by foreign, especially more or less "Celtic" strains of blood, for instance. The "fiery and passionate" Welsh blood of the wronged maidservant in "The Musgrave Ritual" leads Holmes naturally to assume that to revenge herself she trapped the butler, Brunton, in a secret chamber (396); Holmes surmises that Stapleton's Spanish wife in "The Hound of the Baskervilles" similarly decided to betray him only when she finally discovered his infidelity (766). The "fiery tropical blood" of Peruvian and Brazilian wives helps account for the intensity of their jealousy in later stories (SUSS, 1038; THOR, 1057). Englishwomen, especially those of the higher classes, exercise more self-control and can conceal their emotions—and their secrets—more effectively. Working-class women are doubly marked for exploitation: the same class conventions that make their bodies available for sexual consumption by gentlemen govern the taking of information as well, as is clear when Holmes chides Watson for not exploiting all possible sources of information about the suspect in "The Adventure of the Retired Colourman":

With your natural advantages, Watson, every lady is your helper and accomplice. What about the girl at the post-office, or the wife of the greengrocer? I can picture you whispering soft nothings with the young lady at the Blue Anchor, and receiving hard somethings in exchange. (1116)

Holmes exploits the same convenient confusion between sexual and factual exchange in "The Adventure of Charles Augustus Milverton," in which he courts and even becomes engaged to the housemaid in order to gain information about Milverton's house and habits (576).

Although the previous romantic entanglements of middle- and upper-class women are at the root of many mysteries that Holmes solves, their sexual vulnerability is more limited and does not so automatically guarantee that their motives will be as easily penetrable. Holmes may opine that the genteel woman outside male control like the Lady Frances Carfax constitutes "one of the most dangerous classes in the world" insofar as her wealth and independence, by allowing her to act on her desires, make her "the inevitable inciter of crimes in others" (LADY, 942-43). But in many cases involving gentlewomen the disruptive sexuality that Belsey analyzes is defused by their voluntary suppression of desire in obe-
dience to genteel, chivalric codes of courtship. Holmes is "indescribably" annoyed by the "calm aloofness and supreme self-complaisance" of Violet de Merville, for instance (ILLU, 992–93); her irrational attachment to the evil Baron Gruner serves as an example of woman's illogic to Holmes (988), but her passion is rendered tacitly and genteely asexual by being portrayed as a kind of other-worldly fanaticism (991) that is ultimately susceptible to "moral" proof against him (999). Women like Lady Brackenstall often possess a force of character and a "charming personality" that temporarily deceive even Holmes (ABBE, 642); the greater freedom of her Australian girlhood may have encouraged her involvement with another man (638), but her social code still insures that he be of the same class and platonically devoted to rescuing her from a drunken aristocrat (648–49). Other types of power are also reserved to middle- and upper-class women. Disguise is usually Holmes's exclusive province, but Lady Hilda Trelawney Hope exploits it successfully against a lower-class constable to extricate herself from the repercussions of an "indiscreet" letter written before her marriage (SECO, 662, 664–65). Although Irene Adler's class is more ambiguous, she is most successful in maintaining control of her sexuality and her secrets, perhaps because what she lacks in gentility, she makes up for by possessing a "soul of steel" and "the mind of the most resolute of men" (SCAN, 166). Indeed, her demimonde status is itself a valuable weapon; it is not low enough to prevent her from marrying a respectable lawyer, but it is sufficiently questionable to enable her to turn the tables on the exploitative aristocrat and blackmail the King of Bohemia for having "cruelly wronged" her by deserting her for a prudent political marriage with the strictly proper daughter of another royal family (175). True, she "responds beautifully"—that is, predictably, "naturally"—when Holmes stages a fire on the assumption that "when a woman thinks that her house is on fire, her instinct is at once to rush to the thing which she values most" (173). But she later revenges herself on him for having "made [her] reveal what [he], wanted to know" (174); she successfully usurps both the appearance and the prerogatives of a man by disguising herself and later escaping the country with the incriminating photograph. Like the other women just discussed, however, she voluntarily polices herself so that her potential subversion of social order is muted. By choosing not to use the photograph, she ultimately abets the more

Rosemary Jann 699
pervasive pattern in Holmes’s stories, whereby the upper classes are almost always enabled to escape social and legal punishments for their crimes.

He loved to lie in the very centre of five millions of people, with his filaments stretching out and running through them, responsive to every little rumour or suspicion of unsolved crime. (CARD, 888)

Even the world of crime, the realm of ultimate social deviance, is implicitly ordered by class distinctions that identify common criminals by their regressive bodily signs while characterizing the criminal genius by the range of his intellect. Watson often conceives of the investigation of crime as the hunting of wild beasts in the “dark jungle of criminal London” (EMPT, 488; see also BLAC, 565). It is thus appropriate that so many of these criminals bear the atavistic physical signs that marked the Lombrosoan criminal type as an evolutionary throwback to animal or savage.21 Enoch Drebber’s former status as a Mormon Elder cannot redeem him from the moral degeneracy written in his “low forehead, blunt nose, and prognathous jaw”—the classic signs of the apelike Lombrosoan deviant (STUD, 29). Jonathan Small in “The Sign of Four” is similarly “monkey-faced” (124), as is Beppo, the Italian sculptor in “The Adventure of the Six Napoleons” (586), while a “beetling forehead” and “sunken animal eyes” mark the criminal body of the escaped convict Selden in “The Hound of the Baskervilles” (745).

As a connoisseur of crime, Holmes is only momentarily challenged by the machinations of such genetically programmed thugs. He frequently laments the “dullness” and lack of “audacity and romance” in the London crime scene (BRUC, 913; WIST, 870) and rejoices when he encounters a wrongdoer whom he can “be proud to do business with” (PRIO, 548). But such “business” can only be conducted among intellectual, and by extension, social equals. In considering the common people incapable of “great” crimes, the Holmes stories continue what Foucault has described as the “aesthetic rewriting of crime” in nineteenth-century Europe; as such crimes become “the exclusive privilege of those who are really great,” the focus shifts from physical confrontation and punishment to the intellectual contest between murderer and detective.22 Intelligent crime becomes a kind of business that requires at least bourgeois status in its entrepreneurs. Jonathan Small, for instance,
possesses "a degree of low cunning" but lacks the "delicate finesse" that is "usually a product of higher education" (SIGN, 135), and it takes aristocratic blood and an Oxford education to put John Clay, the mastermind of the Red-Headed League, "at the head of his profession" (REDH, 186). "When a doctor does go wrong," his "nerve" and "knowledge" insure that he will rank among "the first of criminals" (SPEC, 270). Even the highly intelligent butler who masterminds the treasure hunt in "The Musgrave Ritual" turns out to be a former schoolmaster who commands many foreign languages and musical instruments (389).

Primacy in the criminal world is reserved for those great minds which rival Holmes's own. Stapleton's audacity and intelligence prove him a "foeman who is worthy of our steel" in "The Hound of the Baskervilles" (698); Baron Gruner, "a real aristocrat of crime," shares Holmes's artistic temperament, the sign of that "complex mind" that "all great criminals" possess (ILLU, 987–88). These men yield first place, of course, to James Moriarty, the mathematical genius, the Napoleon of crime (FINA, 471), and mastermind of a vast bureaucracy of criminal activity. An executive who follows "the American business principle" of "paying for brains" (VALL, 777), Moriarty can thus administer criminal activity without getting his own hands dirty. As the only foe whom Holmes admits to the same intellectual plane as himself (FINA, 475), Moriarty cannot of course be considered a mere crook; his managerial skill is no shop-keeper's cunning, but the practical counterpart of his rarefied mathematical genius (VALL, 769–70). Although Moriarty is finally overcome by Holmes's greater physical skill (EMPT, 486), their real rivalry has been presented as one of pure intellect.

It goes without saying that these criminal geniuses are free from the genetic stigmata of crime that mark their underlings. Stapleton is "clean-shaven" and "prim-faced" (HOUN, 706), and John Clay's white hands and clean-cut boyish looks allow him to masquerade as a philanthropist (REDH, 186, 188). When their criminal propensities are marked in their bodies, it is usually through the more conventional physiognomical signs that shape their expressions, rather than an animalistic fixity of their features. Gruner's cruel mouth marks a face that is otherwise "regular and pleasing" (ILLU, 996). Brunton is a "well-grown, handsome man" with the "splendid forehead" that is the traditional sign of a large intellect (MUSG, 389). Moriarty possesses the same high domed forehead,
his “manner” may strike Holmes as “reptilian,” but his features are “ascetic” (FINA, 472). His second in command, Sebastian Moran, combines “the brow of a philosopher” with “Nature’s plainest danger-signals”: cruel eyes and an aggressive nose (EMPT, 492).

Holmes and Moriarty are doubles in a class by themselves, capable of raising crime to a fine art.24 With Moriarty gone, Holmes becomes so frustrated with the “unworthiness” of London crime that at the beginning of “The Bruce-Partington Plans” he is tempted to turn criminal himself, and in fact later breaks into a house in the pursuit of evidence (BRUC, 913, 927; see also CHAR, 578 and ILLU, 998). Just as Holmes and Moriarty transcend ordinary social typing by their claims to an aristocracy of talent, both are adept at evading classification, able to remain “aloof” from “general suspicion” and “admirable” in “self-effacement” (VALL, 770). Both can read their interlocutors without being read themselves (VALL, 775; BLAN, 1000). Moriarty can easily pass himself off as an innocent and fatherly professor, and Holmes is a skilled actor.

Indeed, the ability to counterfeit himself makes Holmes, the reader of all social codes, appear to be subject to none. He keeps several small refuges where he is able, as Watson tells us, to change “his personality” at will (BLAC, 559). He is the master of the signs of class and vocation—disguising himself as a groom (SCAN, 168), a “rakish young workman” complete with “swagger” (CHAR, 575), an aged seaman with “workhouse cough” and bandy legs (SIGN, 133). He as easily masters the signs of gender—the bumbling of an old woman (MAZA, 1014)—and of ethnicity, being as adept in the broken English of an old Italian priest (FINA, 474) as he is in the slang of an Irish-American malcontent (LAST, 975). Although the value of physiognomy and medical symptoms as signs rests in their supposedly involuntary and unconscious betrayal of the subject’s character, Holmes easily counterfeits the hunchback of the old book seller (EMPT, 485), the thin, wrinkled lassitude of the opium addict (TWIS, 231), and the death-throes of obscure tropical diseases (DYIN, 941). His own steely- or dreamy-eyed facial expression usually gives nothing away, although Watson can sometimes read the subtle signs of increased excitement in his face (BRUC, 919; DEVI, 960; THOR, 1068). Holmes offers only the most extreme example of the way social and intellectual superiority permits the selective transcendence of coding and the control it signifies.
“What one man can invent another can discover.” (DANC, 525)

Holmes can reinforce the power of social ordering all the more effectively for being positioned above the crude machinations and self-interest of official power in his society. Sherlock and Mycroft Holmes, characterized as bureaucratic specialists managing information most efficiently for the public good, belong to that bourgeois aristocracy of talent that claimed to substitute expertise for self-interest in the administration of government in the second half of the nineteenth century. Holmes’s contempt for the ineptness of the official police assumes the intellectual superiority of professional practice to the rigid routine of the functionary. The metaphors Doyle uses to characterize Holmes’s work repeatedly stress its impersonality and disinterestedness. Holmes is “the scientific student of the higher criminal world” (NORW, 496), whose main motive for detection is intellectual curiosity, a “craving for mental exaltation” (SIGN, 90). He possesses “the impersonal joy of the true artist in his better work” (VALL, 773); his cheeks flush “with the exhilaration of the master workman who sees his work lie ready before him” (PRIQ, 547); his brain is an engine that will rack itself to pieces without sufficient evidence to contemplate (DEVI, 960).

Moreover, Holmes appears to champion not the status quo, but a higher or finer code of justice than that insured by official law. It is not the status of his clients, we are told, but the intrinsic merit of their cases, which stimulates Holmes (NOBL, 287). He is far more often the “enforcer of standards of decency” than the imposer of legal sanctions; indeed, he often breaks the law in the service of fair play. But if he is, as Ian Ousby argues, “a law unto himself: the representative of a private code of justice which transcends the technicalities and inflexibilities of official laws,” this private law always works to reinforce the same class prerogatives as those protected by the official ones. Particularly in the later stories, Holmes’s adventures work relentlessly to preserve the social status quo by shielding the upper classes from being legally punished or—what is just as significant in a world where knowledge means power—even allowing their secrets to be told. Sherlock Holmes’s “case book,” Watson tells us, is full of information not only about crimes, but about “the social and official scandals of the late Victorian era”; like Holmes, of course, Watson can always be counted on to protect family honor and reputation by concealing identity (VEIL, 1095). The ending of “The Adventure of the Abbey

Rosemary Jann 703
Grange,” where Holmes serves as judge and Watson as jury to absolve Captain Crocker of any legal responsibility for the murder of the brutal Sir Eustace Brackenstall (650), is only the most obvious case in which Holmes allows genteel or aristocratic people to escape scandal or the legal repercussions of their wrong-doing, so long as chivalric codes of justice and fair play have been served (see also SECO, 666; REDC, 913; DEVI, 970). And in any case, official justice seldom poses any real threat to fair play, for "when the object is good and a client is sufficiently illustrious, even the rigid British law becomes human and elastic" (ILLU, 999). Thus in “The Adventure of the Illustrious Client,” Holmes’s house-breaking is excused as a minor deviance in comparison with Baron Gruner’s aberrant sexuality, which has as a result been prevented from staining the genteel Violet de Merville.

The crimes that Doyle fears are less violations of the official law than challenges to the social and sexual conventions that insured order in his world. Holmes’s discrete interventions are sometimes necessary to readjust the balance of power in this world, but order itself need never be seriously threatened so long as its conventions are biologically inscribed in members of society. The realistic novel teaches us as readers to be “compulsive pursuers of significant design”; nowhere is this truer than in detective fiction, where we are constantly reacting to the pressure of clues that must be interpreted.27 The Holmes stories were calculated to provide their Victorian and Edwardian readers with hypotheses to guide this interpretation, the same hypotheses about human behavior that Holmes follows in deducing an entirely predictable social world. With its wealth of concrete detail, the Holmes canon, like the novel in general, offered a surrogate source of experiential data about that world; specifically, it assured its audience that the same positivistic exactitude that had proved valid in much nineteenth-century natural science could be reliably extended to confirm that the social order rested on a deeper biological order.28 The value of codes rests in their putative universality, their ability to produce a predictable world. Yet the higher classes benefit from the biologizing of their inherent superiority, while they escape from the limitations that biology would impose, remaining less calculable, less constrained by social discipline, and more in control of the secrets that could give others power over them.

Behind the almost compulsive insistence on orderliness in the Holmes stories we can feel the anxious pressure of instability and
disorder. In the assertion that class superiority had a biological basis, that social identity was transparent to the trained viewer, that the higher classes could be counted upon to police themselves, we can sense many of the insecurities of the late Victorian period. Jacqueline Jaffe notes the recurrent imagery of the Holmes stories: Holmes and Watson leave the snug civility of the Baker Street rooms to penetrate the dark, dirty, dangerous world without and restore it to order. As the modern city revealed by sociological investigators increasingly seemed like a jungle, inhabited by savages whose motives were unintelligible and whose potential for violence was unrestricted by common decencies, a key to reading social identity was all the more needed to provide some degree of control over the unknown. As crimes like the Jack the Ripper murders enlarged the imaginable limits of violence in frightening ways, what a comfort to see Sherlock Holmes demonstrating again and again that even the most bizarre cases could be “logically” contained. In a late Victorian society rocked by scandals, how necessary was the reassurance that Holmes and Watson would protect the upper classes from blackmail and publicity, and give them the opportunity to settle their accounts in private. And what better antidote to the threatening sexuality of the New Woman than not to acknowledge it at all—to offer the reassuring spectacle of woman’s predictable unpredictability controlled by chivalric conventions, either imposed from without for their own good or internalized by the women themselves. Faced with increasing evidence of the disruptive power of the irrational and the unconscious, these tales strive to preserve the unified, fully intelligible self of realism by insisting that people remain totally predictable, or that at least among those deserving of social power, the desire that could undermine logic and predictability would be self-policing. Uncoding the social body of the Sherlock Holmes stories reveals the ideological work performed by positivistic science, which could soothe such anxieties by rendering natural and self-evident the social order that generated them.

George Mason University

NOTES

I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for allowing me to attend a summer institute in which I completed some of the research for this essay, and to my colleagues Devon Hodges and Eileen Sypher, who offered valuable suggestions concerning it.

Rosemary Jann

ABBE: “Abbey Grange”
BLAC: “Black Peter”
BLAN: “Blanched Soldier”
BLUE: “Blue Carbuncle”
BOSC: “Boscombe Valley Mystery”
BRUC: “Bruce-Partington Plans”
CARD: “Cardboard Box”
CHAS: “Charles Augustus Milverton”
COFF: “Copper Beeches”
CREE: “Creeping Man”
CROO: “Crooked Man”
DANC: “Dancing Men”
DEVI: “Devil’s Foot”
DYIN: “Dying Detective”
EMPT: “Empty House”
FINA: “Final Problem”
FIVE: “Five Orange Pips”
GLOL: “Gloire Scott”
GOLD: “Golden Pince-Nez”
GREE: “Greek Interpreter”
HOUN: “Hound of the Baskervilles”
IDEN: “Case of Identity”
ILLU: “Illustrious Client”
LADY: “Lady Frances Carfax”
LAST: “Last Bow”
LION: “Lion’s Mane”
MAZA: “Mazarin Stone”
MISS: “Missing Three-Quarter”
MUSG: “Musgrave Ritual”
NAV: “Naval Treaty”
NOBL: “Noble Bachelor”
NORW: “Norwood Builder”
PRIO: “Priory School”
REDC: “Red Circle”
REDH: “Red-Headed League”
REIG: “Reigate Puzzle”
RESI: “Resident Patient”
RETI: “Retired Colourman”
SCAN: “Scandal in Bohemia”
SECO: “Second Stain”
SHOS: “Shoscombe Old Place”
SIGN: “Sign of Four”
SILV: “Silver Blaze”
SIXN: “Six Napoleons”
SOLI: “Solitary Cyclist”
SPEC: “Speckled Band”
STUD: “Study in Scarlet”
SUSS: “Sussex Vampire”
THOR: “Problem of Thor Bridge”
3GAB: “Three Gables”
3GAR: “Three Garridebs”
TWIS: “Man with the Twisted Lip”
VALV: “Valley of Fear”
VEIL: “Veiled Lodger”
WIST: “Wisteria Lodge”
YELL: “Yellow Face”


5 Massimo A. Bonfantini and Giampaolo Prini, “To Guess or Not to Guess?” in *The Sign of Three* (note 3), 127. For the conformity of Holmes’s abductive reasoning, see 128–29.


10 Quoted by Sekula (note 8), 27. Sekula’s comments on Bertillon suggest more specific parallels with Holmes. Under Bertillon’s system, “individuality as such had no meaning. Viewed ‘objectively’ the self occupied a position that was wholly relative” (34).


12 Compare Gian Paolo Capretini’s paraphrase of the abductive method: “x is extraordinary; however, if y would be true, x would not be extraordinary anymore; so, x is possibly true.” “Peirce, Holmes, Popper,” in *The Sign of Three* (note 3), 142.


16 See Sekula (note 8), 20–21, 24–25, and 37 for the changing views of accountability for criminal deeds held by different nineteenth-century theories of criminology.


20 Belsey (note 9), 117.

_Rosemary Jann_ 707


24 See Sekula (note 8), 37, for examples of nineteenth-century criminologists who generally disagreed with the Lombrosian school by judging physiognomical typing useless in classifying the "higher and more dangerous order" of criminals.


26 Ousby (note 2), 168.


28 For the Holmes canon as surrogate source of experience, see Ginzburg (note 7), 101.

29 Jaffe (note 25), 30.

30 See McConnell (note 6), 174, for Victorian anxiety about violent crime; Ousby (note 2), 164–65, for blackmail and publicity.