national culture generates formal deviations whose significances are misread if simply assimilated as modernist or postmodernist aesthetic modes. Asian American work is not properly or adequately explained by the notion of postmodernity as an aesthetic critique of high modernism, for Asian American work emerges out of very different contradictions of modernity: out of the specific conditions of racialization in relation to modern institutions of state government, bourgeois society’s separate spheres, and the liberal citizen-subject. In Chapter 5, “Decolonization, Displacement, Disidentification,” I differentiate European and American postmodern challenges to representation from the “decolonizing” writing that emerges from third world, diaspora, and racialized U.S. American sites. The effects of these works are more radically grasped in terms of their constant interrogation of the discrepancies between national modern forms and what Walter Benjamin would term the material “catastrophes” those forms obscure. Just as the previous discussion highlighted the contradiction between racialized Asian immigrant subjectivity and the abstract citizen proposed by the political sphere of representation, in the following chapters I argue that the subject that emerges out of Asian American cultural forms is one in excess of and in contradiction with the subjectivities proposed by national modern and postmodern modes of aesthetic representation. The discussion of Asian American culture in the chapters that follow begins as “immanent critique” and considers the cultural dynamics of Asian American work as revealing the contradiction between American claims to universality and the particularities erased by those claims, but then dialectically replaces the work in the context of social determinations that generate the work’s inner contradictions. Asian American critique proceeds immanently but enacts the shifting position of dialectical criticism; it can neither immerse itself in the object in the manner of idealizing, redemptive criticism nor take a stand entirely outside culture to criticize the totality as reified.

The contradictions that produce these particulars demand a different notion of the aesthetics of Asian immigrant work, which I elaborate in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, “Unfaithful to the Original,” as an aesthetic of “disidentification” and “infidelity.” This aesthetic is as critical of representational modes such as realism or naturalism as it is critical of a conception of autonomous art separated from material conditions. With regard to the discussion of aesthetics, the notion of “immigrant acts” attempts to locate in the works the “performativity” of immigration, that is, the aesthetics of disidentification and the practices of resignification that the “outsider-within” condition of Asians in America enables. For example, in Chapter 6, I discuss the Korean immigrant’s disidentification with the U.S. nation as being legible in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s critique of the core values of aesthetic realism—correspondence, mimesis, and equivalence—which her text Dictée treats as contradictions. Through an aesthetic of fragmented recitation and episodic nonidentity, repetition is taken to its parodic extreme and disengaged as the privileged mode of imitation and realism. This aesthetic characterizes works that are the sites for the emergence of a new subject.

The contemporary social formation emerges out of a mode of production that conjoins distinct national economies with transnational forms of industry that rely on mixed production, flexible accumulation, and the mobility of capital. Hence, at the present moment, forms of the “modern” U.S. state—citizenship, law, police, military—conjoin with the “postmodern” movements and forces of the global economy, and the political subject that emerges out of this conjunction cannot be strictly captured by the terms of the national political sphere. Thus, “becoming a national citizen” cannot be the exclusive narrative of emancipation for the Asian American subject. Rather, the current social formation entails a subject less narrated by the modern discourse of citizenship and more narrated by the histories of wars in Asia, immigration, and the dynamics of the current global economy. These new conditions displace a former conception of culture and the formation of the citizen it upheld, generating the need for an alternative understanding of cultural production. These discussions consider Asian American culture as one terrain on which the subject formerly narrated by the discourse of citizenship is superseded by a differently located political subject. I argue in Chapter 7, “Work, Immigration, Gender,” that this subject comes into a political formation that is not that of an Asian American claim to citizenship within the nation but one that inhabits a new conjunction and its contradictions, radically challenging nationalist institutions and the simultaneous global economic exploitation of immigrant and third world labor, particularly women.
In keeping with the thesis that a new political subject allegorized by the “immigrant” is articulated simultaneously within both U.S. national and global frameworks, I move from a discussion of Asian American cultural production within a U.S. national context (Chapters 2–4) to one that places the question of Asian American and Asian immigrant culture within an international context (Chapters 5–7). The contradictions of the “nation” are never exclusively bounded in the “local”; rather, local particularisms impli- cate and are implicated in global movements and forces. This imbrication of the national formation of racialized groups within the global political economy is as relevant for Chicano/Latino culture and Anglo-American Black cultures as it is for Asian American culture. As José David Saldívar has argued in *The Dialectics of Our America*, “Local metanarratives never tell the whole story . . . and perhaps we are condemned to oscillate between two metanarratives—one of totalization, the other of emergence.”

Likewise, in *The Black Atlantic*, Paul Gilroy described the Black “countercultures of modernity” that emerge in the space between nationalistic thinking and “the rhizomorphic, fractal structure of the transcultural, international formation” that is nationalism’s antithesis.

In Chapter 3, “Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity,” the material heterogeneities of Asian Americans, of class, gender, and national origin, are discussed in relation to both the modern U.S. nationalist and the oppositional Asian American “cultural nationalist” impulses toward identity. The argument I advance in the move from the contradictions of “the national” to the those of “the national-within-the-international” is that the “cultural nationalist” formation of some Asian American work is motivated by a desire to represent, to make visible the erased and evacuated histories in realist and naturalist modes, and to regard representation of the racialized ethnic group through the aesthetic work as the political function of culture within both an Asian American cultural nationalist and a U.S. national framework. In contrast, contemporaneous work that dialectically engages with the national formation of Asian Americans from the perspective of an international history and location is critical of the representational project and is antagonistic to the “modern” in both aesthetic and political senses. These cultural projects offer alternatives to realist narratives of resolution to the nation, working against the notion of the subject as representative of the nation or group in order to generate conceptions of collectivity that are neither regulated by notions of identity nor prescribed by aesthetic, psychoanalytic, and political modes of identification.

In the former project, the immigrant is fixed and taken as the *symbol* of Asian Americans; as a figure, the immigrant conveys an “ideal type” who represents the generalized condition of the group. In such symbolic figurations, there is a persistent belief in a knowable social totality of which the representative figure is a reflection and in terms of which that figure can be recognized. In the latter project, however, the immigrant is at once both *symbol* and *allegory* for Asian Americans. The immigrant is located in social relations and dialectically placed within historical process and struggle, but the concept of allegory presumes that social and historical processes are not transparent, taking place through what Benjamin calls “correspondences” rather than through figures that represent or reflect a given totality. Such correspondences are neither resemblances nor analogies, but displaced, mediated connections in which the “seizing” of the relation depends not only on a formal analysis of the social and historical conditions but also on the simultaneous comprehension of a displacement, a break, or even an absence—all signaling the impossibility of totality.

The latter project proposes immigration as the *locus* for the encounter of the national border and its “outsides” as the site of both the law and the “crossing of the borders” that is its negative critique. Immigration as both *symbol* and *allegory* does not metaphorize the experiences of “real” immigrants but finds in the located contradictions of immigration both the critical intervention in the national paradigm at the point of its conjunction with the international and the theoretical nexus that challenges the global economic from the standpoint of the locality. In addition, the allegory of immigration does not isolate a singular instance of one immigrant formation, but cuts across individualized racial formations and widens the possibility of thinking and practice across racial and national distinctions. The specific history of Asian immigration in relation to U.S. citizenship is different from the histories of other migrant or racialized groups, such as African Americans, Native Americans, and Chicanos/Latinos, yet the Asian American critique of citizenship generated by its specific history opens the space for such cross-race and cross-national possibilities. One of the im-
important acts that the immigrant performs is breaking the dyadic, vertical determination that situates the subject in relation to the state, building instead horizontal community with and between others who are in different locations subject to and subject of the state. Asian American culture is thus situated to generate what Dipesh Chakrabarty has termed "other narratives of self and community that do not look to the state/citizen bind as the ultimate construction of sociality." 

In our headlong rush to educate everybody, we are ... destroying our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads of the future will encamp in their mechanised caravans.

—T.S. Eliot, Notes Towards a Definition of Culture (1949)

Mrs. Hammerick ... Boiling Spring Elementary School ... I was scared of her like no dark corners could ever scare me. You have to know that all the while she was teaching us history ... she was telling all the boys in our class that I was Pearl and my last name was Harbor. They understood her like she was speaking French and their names were all Claude and Pierre. I felt it in the lower half of my stomach, and it throbbed and throbbed.

—Monique Thuy-Dung Truong, "Kelly" (1991)

In the previous chapter, I argued that the modern nation-state forms abstract citizens for the political sphere, disavowing the racialization and gendering of noncitizen labor in the economic sphere through the reproduction of an exclusive notion of national culture in the cultural sphere. Here, I extend this argument to focus on the liberal educational apparatus of the university as an important site in which these processes come into contradiction. Approaching the question of Asian American Studies in the university as one location of visible struggles over culture, education, and citizenship, I pose T.S. Eliot's 1949 lament that democratized education puts Western culture at risk from the encroachments of both non-Western cultures and mass culture against Monique Thuy-Dung Truong's 1991 short
tives of subject, community, and nation but generating a different political formation as well. This new political formation necessitates new modes of organizing and struggling and, in so doing, extends our understanding of the terrain of the “political.”

I have argued that since the mid-nineteenth century, Asians have been admitted into the U.S. nation in terms of national economic imperatives, while the state has estranged Asian immigrants through racialization and bars to citizenship, thus distancing Asian Americans, even as citizens, from the terrain of national culture. Because it is the purpose of American national culture to form subjects as citizens, this distance has created the conditions for the emergence of Asian American culture as an alternative cultural site, a site of cultural forms that propose, enact, and embody subjects and practices not contained by the narrative of American citizenship. While I have suggested that an “aesthetic” characterizes the works of racialized oppositional cultures such as Asian American culture—one that is different from American modernist and postmodernist aesthetics—I have insisted on de-aestheticizing dominant understandings of Asian Americans in order to present a model for interpreting literature and culture as social forces, as nodes in a network of other social practices and social relations. We have considered here the social spaces of the university, the community, and the workplace, as well as literary, artistic, and cultural representations as crucial sites for studying the shaping, contesting, and transformation of race, gender, and identity.

Historically, the U.S. state has constructed different national “emergencies” around “the immigrant,” which have, over time, generated emergent political formations. Our critical task now is to make the present emergency an active state of emergence in ways that respond to the contemporary conditions of global restructuring—conditions that exploit Asian workers both in Asia and in the deindustrialized United States, that bring new waves of immigrants from Asia and Latin America where precisely the United States has been a colonial or neocolonial power, and that intensify exploitation and worklessness in the United States in ways that exacerbate interracial urban conflicts. Our work begins with an engagement with the past, out of which we imagine, create, and dare to secure a future.

Notes

1 Immigration, Citizenship, Racialization: Asian American Critique


3 In her study of the Vietnam War Memorial and the collective processes of memory, Marita Sturken discusses the critics’ commentary characterizing the monument’s design as a “black gash of shame and sorrow” that symbolized the open, castrated wound of this country’s venture into an unsuccessful war, a war that “emasculated” the United States in its ability to engage in foreign conflicts. See Sturken, Tangled Memories.


6 The concept of the “immigrant” in American sociology and public policy has historically signified “European immigrants,” seeking to universalize the temporality of assimilation attributed to Irish Americans and Italian Americans to the ethnic minority groups from the “third world.” See Robert Blauner, “Colonized and Immigrant Minorities,” in Racial Oppression in America (New York: Harper, 1972). This use erases the heterogeneities and hierarchies within the
“immigrant” category and obscures the processes of racialization that the immigration process instantiates. In reappropriating the category from that history of meaning, I hope to rearticulate “immigration” as a historically specific process in which economic, gendering, and racializing forces converge.

Though my discussion focuses specifically on Asian Americans, the topos of immigration is crucial for Chicano and Latino formation as well. See, for example, Carl Gutiérrez-Jones, *Rethinking the Borderlands: Between Chicano Culture and Legal Discourse* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and David G. Gutiérrez, *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

7 U.S. orientalism of the twentieth century—the institutional, scholarly, and ideological representations of “Asia” and of “Asians in the United States”—may be rhetorically continuous but is materially discontinuous with an earlier European orientalism, which relied on representations of non-Western otherness as barbaric and incomprehensible, as well as with narrative teleologies of universal development. On European orientalism, see Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). U.S. orientalism makes use of some of the representational and narrative regimes of an earlier orientalism that mediated European colonialism, but it has been transformed by a quite different state apparatus and a different global and national context of material conditions, purposes, and possibilities.


8 David Palumbo-Liu examines the scientific racial discourse about Asians in the 1920s and the 1930s that constructed Asians as efficient workers. Some of this research was presented in the paper “Wetbacks and Re-essentialized Confucians” (Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian American Studies, Oakland, Calif., June 1995), and forms part of his work in progress, “Narrating Asian America: Cultural Politics and Subjectivities.” Gary Okikiho’s work on the Asian body also excavates extremely important material on nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century racial and biological discourses about Asians; see Okikiho, “Reading Asian Bodies, Reading Anxieties” (paper presented at the Department of Ethnic Studies, University of California, San Diego, November 1995).


Asians have been alternately subject to two processes of racist/nationalist constructions, what Etienne Balibar distinguishes as “internal racism” that figures racialized groups within a nation-state and “external racism” that is concerned with the construction of groups outside of the nation-state. See Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991). Takashi Fujitani has argued, in a similar vein, that the construction of Japanese Americans as a “model minority” is commensurate with the postwar modernization discourse about Japan as the “model” of capitalist development in Asia. See Fujitani, “Nisei Soldiers as Citizens: Japanese Americans in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses,” paper presented at “The Politics of Remembering the Asia/Pacific War,” University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii, September 1995.

11 In light of the ideological construction of the military subject, the situation of U.S. soldiers of color recruited for the wars in Asia is a complicated and powerful site in which the contradictions between U.S. nationalism and racial formation emerge. Ramón Saldívar writes, for example, of the Chicano sol-

12 Vicente L. Rafael’s discussion of the “immigrant imaginary” is suggestive in this regard. Rafael, “Cultures of Area Studies in the United States” (paper presented at the “Internationalizing Cultural Studies” conference, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994). An earlier version of this paper was published in Social Text 41 (Winter 1994): 91–111.


14 Attempts to exclude Asians began in 1853 in California, when the state legislature levied a capitation tax of fifty dollars on “the immigration to this state of persons who cannot become citizens thereof.” An act in 1858 explicitly named “persons of Chinese or Mongolian races.” In 1862, another act taxed Chinese to “protect free white labor against competition with Chinese coolie labor.” Two acts passed in 1870 were directed against the importation of “Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese females for criminal or demoralizing purposes” and of “coolie slavery.” None of these laws had legal impact, as all were declared unconstitutional when tested in the higher courts. See Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston: Twayne, 1991), 54.


Exclusion efforts were then directed at Indians and Japanese. A geographical criterion was used to exclude Asian Indians, because their racial or ethnic status was unclear; the 1917 immigration act denied entry to people from a “barred zone” that included South Asia through Southeast Asia and islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but excluded American possessions of the Philippines and Guam. The Immigration Act of 1924 barred entry of “aliens ineligible to citizenship”; because Japanese and other Asians were barred by the 1790 naturalization law stipulating that “whites only” could be naturalized as citizens, the 1924 act totally excluded them from immigration. See Gary R. Hess, “The ‘Hindu’ in America: Immigration and Naturalization Policies and India, 1917–1946,” Pacific Historical Review 38 (1969): 59–79; reprinted in Asian Indians, Filipinos, Other Asian Communities, and the Law, ed. Charles McClain, Asian Indians and American Immigration, ed. Charles McClain (New York: Garland, 1994); and Earl H. Pritchard, “The Japanese Exclusion Bill of 1924,” Research Studies of the State College of Washington 2 (1930): 65–77, reprinted in Asian Immigrants and American Law, ed. Charles McClain (New York: Garland, 1994).

The government did not have to exclude Koreans officially, because emigration from Korea had already been curbed by the Japanese colonial administration. Owing to U.S. colonization of the Philippines, Filipinos were “wards” of the United States and were called “nationals”; they were neither aliens nor citizens, and to exclude them required a change in their status. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 cut Filipino immigration to a quota of fifty persons per year, and all Filipinos in the United States were reclassified as “aliens.” See Lee Houchnis and Chang-su Houchnis, “The Korean Experience in America, 1903–24,” Pacific Historical Review 43 (1974): 548–75; and H. Brett Melendy, “Filipinos in the United States,” Pacific Historical Review 43 (1974): 99–117, reprinted in McClain, Asian Indians, Filipinos, Other Asian Communities, and the Law. The U.S. exclusion of Filipino immigration was continually connected with the issue of Philippine independence from U.S. colonization; see Bruno Lasker, Filipino Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

15 Neil Gotanda has discussed the legal history of the period from 1943 to 1950, during which Chinese exclusion was repealed and Chinese were granted citizenship and naturalization; see Gotanda, “Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion: The Magnuson Act of 1943, the Act of July 2, 1946, the Presidential Proclamation of July 4, 1946, the Act of August 9, 1949, and the Act of August 1, 1950,” in Asian Americans in Congress: A Documentary History, ed. Hyung Chan Kim (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995).

16 The 1965 immigration act removed “national origins” as the basis of American immigration legislation and was framed as an amendment to the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. The 1965 act abolished “national origin” quotas and
specified seven preferences for Eastern Hemisphere quota immigrants: (1) unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens; (2) spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents; (3) professionals, scientists, and artists of "exceptional ability"; (4) married adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; (5) siblings of adult citizens; (6) workers, skilled and unskilled, in occupations for which labor was in short supply in the United States; and (7) refugees from Communist-dominated countries or those uprooted by natural catastrophe. See Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy, 1850–1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), appendix B. Since 1965, two million Asian quota immigrants, two million nonquota immigrants, and one million refugees outside the seventh preference have arrived. The subsequent 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, the 1980 Refugee Act, and the 1987 Amerasian Homecoming Act have facilitated Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao, and Thai immigration and resettlement. See Chan, Asian Americans, 146–47.

Gary Y. Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994). Okihiro argues that in the struggles for inclusion and equality, Asian Americans have helped preserve and advance the ideals of democracy and have thereby made the United States a freer place for not only Asian Americans but others as well.


In taking up the concept of contradiction, I mean to adopt the Marxist concept that describes the dialectic within which domination creates its own dynamic negation. For Marx, capitalism generates its own contradictions, the primary one being between capital and labor that precipitates proletarian consciousness and the overthrow of the capitalist system.

It will be evident in these chapters, however, that I depart from the singular, deterministic teleology associated with the more orthodox use of contradiction, for it proves inadequate for understanding the many sites of contradiction within historically situated social formations. While Marx proposes that the classical contradiction exists between capital and labor—a contradiction that permits the accumulation of surplus value through the exploitation of labor while it also produces class struggles—both the early conditions of Asian immigration within the still developing U.S. economy and the contemporary circumstances of Asian Americans within "postmodern" capitalist global economy make apparent that we must always speak of more than one contradiction that works in and through its articulation with other contradictions. In this chapter, for example, I elaborate the ways in which what might be theorized as economic contradiction is within the specificity of U.S. history also always a racial and gendered contradiction: the state claims to be a democratic body in which all subjects are granted membership, while the racialized immigrant workers from whom capital profits are historically excluded from political participation in the state. At the same time, the genealogy of exclusions and enfanchisements "genders" immigrant subjects in relation to the types of labor needed by capital; in the contemporary California economy, the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 makes clear that "legal" immigrant labor is constructed as "male," whereas "illegal" immigrant labor is constructed as "female" (see note 54 below, this chapter). Contradictions may be "antagonistic" or "nonantagonistic" according to their state of "overdetermination" or the ways in which contradictions converge. Louis Althusser has argued that in periods of "stability" the contradictions of the social formation are neutralized by displacement, whereas in a revolutionary situation (such as the 1917 Bolshevik movement in Russia), these contradictions may fuse or condense into a "rupture." Stuart Hall proposes that the material conditions of a given historical moment will bring one contradiction to the surface out of the convergence of contradictions. See Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1969); and Hall, "Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2, no. 2 (June 1985): 91–114.


24 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (New York: Continuum, 1973), writes: “Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance, I have no way but to break immanently, in its own measure, through the appearance of total identity. Since that totality is structured to accord with logic, however, whose core is the principle of the excluded middle, whatever will not fit this principle, whatever differs in quality, comes to be designated as a contradiction. Contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit it exceeds itself. Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint” (5).


27 See note 16 above on the seven preferences of the 1965 act. Eithne Luibheid has argued that while the 1965 act may have “opened” the United States to new immigrants, it also produced differentiated categories of “the immigrant” for surveillance and regulation: Luibheid, “The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act: An ‘End’ to Exclusion?” *positions* (forthcoming). Leti Volpp has observed that “the notion of citizenship is being used to assert a particular privilege that more recently was asserted through whiteness”; see Volpp, “Immigration, Gender, and Violence: The Rest against the West” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian American Studies, Oakland, Calif., June 1995).

28 Michel Foucault analyzed the discursive production and management of objects of knowledge through texts, social practices, laws, and institutions and was concerned with the productive function of discursive exclusions and inclusions; paradoxically, for Foucault, both prohibitive policing and individual “freedoms” granted by the liberal state institutions are forms through which subjects and communities are regulated. See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish,*
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979). In the context of U.S. immigration law, we can consider both the disenfranchisement of Asians as aliens and the enfranchisement of Asians as citizens as forms of surveillance and regulation.

29 I use the term “genealogy” in reference to Foucault’s work. To revise the historiographical tendency to project progressions and totalities, Foucault elaborates the concept of genealogy as a series of moments or conjunctions wherein it may be possible to analyze the coherence, logic, and specific types of relations within each moment or shift, neither imposing necessary causalities, homogenieties, or analogies nor assuming that the same form of historicity operates on all spheres of human society. Such series may overlap and intersect. He writes of a “new history” that “speaks of series, divisions, limits, differences of level, shifts, chronological specificities, particular forms of rehandling, and possible types of relation. This is not because it is trying to obtain a plurality of histories juxtaposed and independent of one another: that of the economy beside that of institutions, and beside these two those of science, religion, or literature... The problem that now presents itself... is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described between these different series: what vertical system they are capable of forming: what interplay of correlation and dominance exists between them; what may be the effect of shifts, different temporalities, and various rehandlings; in what distinct totalities certain elements may figure simultaneously: in short, not only what series, but also what ‘series of series’—or, in other words, what ‘tables’ it is possible to draw up.” Foucault, _The Archaeology of Knowledge_, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper, 1972), 10. See also Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in _Language, Counter-Memory, Practice_, Donald Bouchard, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).

In a separate essay on “governmentality,” Foucault outlines a particular “series”—namely, “government, population, political economy”—to advance the thesis that since the eighteenth century, through government and its apparatuses, disciplinary societies in the West have replaced the former societies ruled by sovereigns. Government—and the “political space” within techniques of government—emerges as the disciplinary mode designed to manage population and to administer property. “This state of government which bears essentially on population and both refers itself to and makes use of the instrumentation of economic savoir could be seen as corresponding to a type of society controlled by apparatuses of security.” Because governmentality as a mode of social discipline cannot be fundamentally altered by contestations on the political terrain of government, our struggles must take the form of practices that demand the transformation of the “political” and the governmentality it upholds. Foucault, “Governmentality” (1978), in _The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality_, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

30 My argument is indebted to the theory of racial formation and the racial state elaborated by Michael Omi and Howard Winant, _Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s_ (New York: Routledge, 1994).


33 Chan, _Asian Americans_, 105–7; Hing, _Making_, 21–26. Throughout the nineteenth century, the number of Chinese women in the United States did not exceed five thousand, or 7 percent of the total Chinese population; the very small number of Chinese women who had immigrated before these bans were doubly bound by patriarchal controls inside Chinatowns and anti-Chinese racism outside. See Judy Yung, _Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Gary Y. Okibiro, _Margins and Mainstreams_, Chapter 3.

The 1922 Cable Act demonstrates that the designation of U.S.-born female citizens was also a racialized designation, for while the Cable Act contained provisions for U.S.-born women of European or African descent to reclaim
their citizenship in the event of divorce from a noncitizen spouse, or after the death of a noncitizen spouse, there were no such provisions for U.S.-born Asian immigrant women. See Virginia Sapiro, “Women, Citizenship, Nationality,” Politics and Society 13 (1984): 1–26; Chan, Asian Americans, 106; Yung, Unbound, 168.


35 See, for example, Richard White, It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own (Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). White observes that the rural Chinese who achieved financial success did so as merchants, large tenant farmers, and labor contractors; their successes depended on their ability to command large numbers of Chinese workers at low wages (284). White writes, “In time, manufacturers themselves turned against the Chinese as Chinese merchants attempted to open factories in competition with white-owned factories” (341).

Daniel Rosenberg, “The 1WW and Organization of Asian Workers in Early Twentieth Century America,” Labor History 36, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 77–87, locates the source of anti-Japanese hostility in American middle-class fears of future competition with immigrant businessmen. Rosenberg argues, however, that against such hostility, the “1WW (Industrial Workers of the World) consistently worked for cooperation of Asian and non-Asian workers and that Asian Americans supported multiracial unionism. Such was the case in California’s fruit and vegetable industries, from which arose the anarchist-led Fresno Labor League in 1908, with ties to the 1WW, which had four thousand Japanese grape pickers in its initial membership” (78).

36 Marx writes that “abstract labour” is “absolutely indifferent to its particular specificity.” Capital, according to Marx, can recognize the specificity of work tasks but not the particularities of laborers. Karl Marx, “Chapter on Capital,” in Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973), 256–57. In a sense, contrary to the classical Marxist understanding that capital seeks “abstract labor,” the use of Chinese immigrant labor demonstrates that even in the nineteenth century, U.S. capital profited precisely from the “flexible” racializing of Asian labor. Marx’s elaboration of the “abstract citizen” in relation to the political state in “On the Jewish Question” is discussed later in this chapter.

For white workers, the surplus of Chinese labor lowered their wages and led to overproduction and unemployment that was expressed in general strikes in 1869, 1877, and 1886 and the organization of radical workers’ groups. The crisis of overproduction and class conflict is discussed by Thomas J. McCor-


42 On Asian immigrant communities to the United States following 1965, see Paul Ong, Edna Bonacich, and Lucie Cheng, eds., The New Asian Immigration in Los Angeles and Global Restructuring (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). These essays examine the ways that the global restructuring of capitalism has affected post-1965 Asian immigrant communities, pinpointing the contradictions of capitalist restructuring that produces a heterogeneous Asian immigrant population made up of both low-wage, service-sector and manufacturing laborers and what they call “middle-class professionals.” I would want to modify this analysis of the class bifurcation of post-1965 Asian immigration through reference to the concept of the “white-collar proletariat,” which de-
scribes U.S. capital’s demotion and manipulation of skilled labor in the period of transition from entrepreneurial to corporate capitalism after the 1960s. See Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Harper, 1976). Because trained Asian immigrants, in particular, are subject to this demotion and manipulation, the “white-collar proletarianization” of Asian-educated immigrant engineers or nurses needs to be distinguished from situations of U.S.-educated, white middle-class “professional.” Richard Appelbaum recalls Marx’s distinction between “constant capital” (investment in machinery and equipment) and “variable capital” (the costs of living labor) in order to point to current transnational capitalist strategies for maximizing profits through exploitative “flexible” reorganization and management of skilled and semi-skilled labor. Variable capital is a crucial concept for understanding the use of lower-cost Asian immigrant professionals as one form of capital investment for the maximizing of surplus value. See Appelbaum, “Multiculturalism and Flexibility: Some New Directions in Global Capitalism,” *Mapping Multiculturalism*, Avery Gordon and Christopher Newfield, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

Yet two additional political dimensions of the post-1965 immigrant group deserve mention. First, nations sending immigrants to the United States may often send off skilled, potentially disaffected workers as a safety valve in times of economic austerity, for it results in remittances for the “home” country, one of the key elements in the balance of payments for countries like the Philippines. Second, the U.S. government and business community has formal and informal relationships with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia; in return for low-wage industrialization and sources of investment, the immigration of Asian elites from those countries may be encouraged and protected. For instance, the U.S. government has protected members of the Korean CIA who have immigrated in order to monitor the politics of Korean American community; see Elaine H. Kim and Eui-Young Yu, *East to America: Korean American Life Stories* (New York: New Press, 1996); Nancy Abelmann and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riot* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Immigrants with ties to the Taiwanese government have also had active involvements with the repression of dissident activity in Chinatowns in the United States; see L. Ling-chi Wang’s analysis, “The Structure of Dual Domination: Toward a Paradigm for the Study of the Chinese Diaspora in the United States,” in *Amerasia Journal* 21, nos. 1 and 2 (1995): 149–69. In this regard, we must view the post-1965 immigrant popular as complex in both its political and economic profile.

43 See Aihwa Ong, “The Gender and Labor Politics of Postmodernity,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 1991, 20:279–309; Swasti Mitter, *Common Fate, Common Bond: Women in the Global Economy* (London: Pluto, 1986); and Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labor* (London: Zed, 1986). Ong and Mitter point out that the important features of the current global restructuring are “mixed production” and “flexible accumulation” that allow transnational corporations to fragment and separate the operations of production: labor-intensive parts of production can be sent to Asia and Latin America, where there is an abundance of low-wage, “docile” labor; if more profitable, the same fragmentation allows manufacturers to shift work to small subcontractors at the center of the market in the “first world” for smaller units can avoid problems with organized union labor and employment regulations. Mies argues that through these strategies, capital rearticulates patriarchal gender ideologies that relegate women to reproduction and domestic labor, leading to what she calls the “housewifization” of work.

44 Louis Althusser elaborates “overdetermination” as the convergence of different, nonequivalent contradictions that constitute a social formation or a “structure in dominance.” The overdetermination of a contradiction is its relationship to its conditions of existence (i.e., the other contradictions) within the complex whole. The accumulation and exacerbation of all the historical contradictions produces a “weak link” that marks the vulnerability of the system; Althusser refers to the “tangle” of Russia’s internal and external contradictions” that precipitated the Bolshevik movement as a historical example of the accumulation and exacerbation of the historical contradictions of residual forms of medieval feudal exploitation in the countryside, large-scale capitalist production in the major cities, imperialist exploitation, and class struggles within the Russian ruling classes themselves. See Louis Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” in *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1969).

45 William Appleman Williams wrote: “One of the central themes of American historiography is that there is no American Empire. Most historians will admit, if pressed, that the United States once had an empire. They then promptly insist that it was given away. But they also speak persistently of America as a World Power.” Williams, “The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy,” *Pacific Historical Review* 24 (November 1955): 79–95. See also Amy Kaplan, “Left Alone with America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture,” *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).


See Homi K. Bhabha, “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism,” in *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994). In his elaboration of the colonialist stereotype, Homi Bhabha has relied on the psychoanalytic sense of fetishism, which reactivates the anxiety of castration and sexual difference, whereas the racist scene mobilizes anxiety about racial difference and the absence of racial purity that is expressed in the anxious repetitive fixing of racialized difference in the fetish object of the stereotype. In a significant departure from Bhabha’s argument, I would locate a “contradictory space” that disrupts the racist construction not exclusively in the domain of phantasmatic anxiety about race but in the material conditions of wars against Japan, in Korea, and in Vietnam, and the racialized gendered division of labor in the domestic United States.

Gotanda, “Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion.”


Quotas were not specified by national origin, but through racialized ethnic categories such as “Chinese.” In other words, the McCarran-Walter Act provided that one hundred ethnic Chinese persons enter annually; these Chinese originated from diverse nations. Even laws that repealed exclusion acts continued to “racialize” Asians. Neil Gotanda, “Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion.” See also Gotanda, “Our Constitution Is Colorblind,” *Stanford Law Review*, 44, no. 1 (November 1991): 1–68.

Though Proposition 187 has been blocked by court procedures that are still determining if it is unconstitutional, its passage in November 1994 produced immediate and widespread effects: the sanctioning of increasingly violent patrolling of the border of the United States and Mexico; legalization of the inspection of immigrant minority communities; intimidation of communities against seeking routine or emergency medical care; and the use of fear of deportation further to exploit immigrant workers in low-wage domestic service, unsafe agricultural work, and menial repetitive assembly work. That Governor Pete Wilson ordered, the morning after the election, prenatal care and immunizations to be terminated for “illegal aliens” marks the degree to which this proposition is directed at immigrant women; anti-immigrant discourse fertilizes images of racialized reproduction and feminized or infantilized bodily need as part of its campaign. But these images both acknowledge and disavow: they acknowledge the economic condition in which the “autonomy” of the white, middle-class male subject is dependent on the racialized and gendered division of labor, and they disavow that dependency by displacing it into the representational domains of racialized and sexualized stereotype.

Kitty Calavita analyzes the contemporary contradiction between anti-immigrant reactions juxtaposed with economic need for immigrant labor and the conflict between restrictionism, on the one hand, and the economic forces that accelerate illegal immigration, on the other. See Calavita, “U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of Legislation,” in *Controlling*

According to Omi and Winant: “Racial projects do the ideological ‘work’ of making these links. A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines. Racial projects connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning.” See ibid., 56.


In emphasizing race as the locus of struggle, the simultaneous class and gender struggles were less adequately addressed by the cross-race movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The fracturing of these movements was as much the result of these internal contradictions of gender and class as they were produced by external assaults by the FBI, the police, and conservative organizations.


In The Sexual Contract (London: Polity, 1988), Carole Pateman persuasively argues that the founding of civil society and the state through the social contract establishes male patriarchal right over women: “Women are not party to the original contract through which men transform their natural freedom into the security of civil freedom. Women are the subject of the contract. The (sexual) contract is the vehicle through which men transform their natural right over women into the security of civil patriarchal right” (6).

Marx, Grundrisse, 296.


For a discussion of modernist aestheticism and the different historicity of the avant-garde, see Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). On the possibilities of political art detached from notions of originality or authenticity that emerge from hybrid, residual sites, see Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations.

George Lipsitz has used the term “families of resemblance” to evoke the relations between the styles and practices taken up by different subcultures of racialized groups. Rosalinda Fregoso’s work, for example, elaborates the Chicana/Chicano film aesthetic, emphasizing the breaks with dominant forms and cultural codes that rearticulate history and collective memory rather than aspiring toward a notion of autonomous art. Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Fregoso, The Bronze Screen: Chicana and Chicano Film Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).


On other racialized minority sites of contradiction, see, for example, José David Saldívar, The Dialectics of Our America: Genealogy, Cultural Critique, and

72 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in *Illuminations*.

73 Bertolt Brecht’s critique of Georg Lukács’s claims about the political subject produced by the aesthetic mode of realism is relevant in this regard. If shifts in the mode of production necessitate a new subject, then new aesthetic modes are required to accommodate the complex convergences and differentiations in the social formation. See Theodor W. Adorno et al., *Aesthetics and Politics*, afterword by Fredric Jameson (London: Verso, 1980).


75 Judith Butler’s and Homi K. Bhabha’s elaborations of “performativity”—as a critical disruption of symbolic categories—are suggestive and helpful. See Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Butler, “Critically Queer,” *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (New York: Routledge, 1993); and Bhabha, “Disseminations,” *The Location of Culture* (Routledge, 1994). See also Karen Shimakawa’s work discussing Asian American theater representation as a cultural practice of “critical mimesis” that both thematizes and displaces the situation of Asian Americans as “object” to the U.S. nation-state and American culture: Shimakawa, “‘made, not born’: National Abjection and the Asian American Body on Stage” (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1994).


77 Saldívar, *Dialectics of Our America*.


79 The distinction between symbol and allegory can be elaborated through Raymond Williams’s discussion of “reflection” and “mediation” in *Marxism and Literature* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), which Williams poses suggestively as a contrast between Georg Lukács and Walter Benjamin’s theories of art. Williams associates the symbol as much with the “ideal type” of traditional heroic narratives, as with the tendency toward “typification” in Lukács’s concept of the “world-historical individual,” or socialist realism’s selection of the representative example situated within the constitutive and constituting processes of social and historical reality. In such typifications, there is a presumption of a knowable historical totality in terms of which the typification will be recognized, and symbolic figuration typifies “the elements and tendencies of reality that recur according to regular laws, although changing with the changing circumstances.” (Lukács, quoted in Williams, 102, my emphasis). For Benjamin, however, social and historical processes are always mediated through “correspondences,” rather than “types” that reflect a given social reality. Benjamin’s concept of correspondences does not imply an analogy or homology between the figure and the totality but rather proposes a dialectic of displaced connections, a dialectic that considers the relation of parts to fractured wholes and seeks to be “historical” amid the losses and contingencies of history. Indeed, Benjamin elaborated the aesthetic ramifications of the difference between symbol and allegory in *Origin of German Tragic Drama* (New Left Books, 1977) and actually discusses allegory as always revealing a “cross-
ing of the border of a different mode... Its intrusion could therefore be described as a harsh disturbance of the peace and a disruption of law and order in the arts." (177, my emphasis).


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6 The historical sites for these alliances have been the demands for departments of ethnic studies, third world studies, or women's studies; other recent sites include the fight to maintain the University of California as a public university that serves the racially and economically diverse constituency of California in light of the 1994 regents' decision to abolish affirmative action.


15 Immigrants from South Asia are not a "new" group, having come to the United States since the late nineteenth century. Like other Asian immigrant groups,