range of phenomena wider than I have attempted, I believe that any account of nativist modernism would end up making American literary history central.

I have also criticized the idea of cultural identity as it was developed in the '20s and as it is sometimes used today, but it should be clear that my criticism of cultural identity and my history of its nativist origins are separate. What's wrong with the current conception of cultural identity is not that it developed out of racial identity (although the fact that it did may well explain how what's wrong with it got to be wrong with it); what's wrong with cultural identity is that, without recourse to the racial identity that (in its current manifestations) it repudiates, it makes no sense.

Notes

1 William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury, ed. David Minter (New York, 1987), 176. Subsequent references are to this edition and are cited in parentheses in the text.


3 Congressional Record—House (1924), 5677. The speaker is Congressman Watkins from Oregon, and the complete sentence reads: "The sooner this Congress lays down the proposition of not admitting the people of those nations who can not assimilate, who can not become a part of our blood, our tongue, our life, and our ways, the sooner will we begin to mirror the sentiments and the wishes of the great body of Americans who want America for Americans. [Applause.]"

4 Congressional Record—House (1924), 5693. The speaker here is Congressman Allen who, after observing that the "primary reason for the restriction of the alien stream is the necessity for purifying and keeping pure the blood of America," goes on to remark that the "danger line has been reached, if not passed. The percentage of illiterates here is too large and the percentage of unassimilable aliens is also excessive."

5 Calvin Coolidge, America's Need for Education (Boston, 1925), 56. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text.


7 Stephen M. Ross accurately remarks that "However despairing or nihilistic a given reader may find The Sound and the Fury, the momentary ameliorative affirmation engendered by the Easter sermon is almost universally acknowledged" (Fiction's Inexhaustible Voice: Speech and Writing in Faulkner [Athens, 1989], 36). But it's essential to recognize that the opposition between the redemptive aspirations of the sermon and the presumed nihilism of the rest of the book is a false one; in the effort to make blood be blood, incest is as good as Easter. Insofar, then, as the sermon counts as an "affirmation," what it affirms is the preference for identity over representation that every other section of The Sound and the Fury also affirms.

8 Arguing against what he characterizes as the "Lost Generation" interpretation of this period, Charles C. Alexander asserts that "renewed inquiry into the history of American thought and culture in the twenties highlights the potent workings of a hopeful,
often buoyantly confident cultural nationalism," and he identifies this nationalism with Frederick Lewis Allen's hope that "the time had come when the most powerful nation in the world might rid itself of its cultural subjection to Europe" (Charles C. Alexander, *Here the Country Lies: Nationalism and the Arts in Twentieth-Century America* [Bloomington, 1980], 110). But while it is certainly true that postwar disillusion has virtually no explanatory value with respect to "the complex history of ideas and art in the American 1920s" (108), Alexander's own failure to connect the critique of "cultural subjection to Europe" with the attack on immigration and "cultural nationalism" with nativist racism leads him to misunderstand both phenomena and to replace the empty profundities of the Lost Generation with the equally empty (albeit more broadly applicable) profundities of the American struggle for cultural independence. For a more useful cultural history of the '20s, one that unfortunately appeared too late for me to take its insights into account, see Ann Douglas, *Terrible Honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920s* (New York, 1995).

9 Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (New York, 1934; reprint 1970), 200. Subsequent references are to this edition and are cited in parentheses in the text.

10 Willa Cather, *The Professor's House* (New York, 1973), 132, 78. Subsequent references are to this edition and are cited in parentheses in the text.

11 F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby* (New York, 1925), 17, 131, 146. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text.

12 Charles W. Gould, *America, A Family Matter* (New York, 1922), 163. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text. It is perhaps worth mentioning that Gould, like the more influential racist writer Lothrop Stoddard, was published by Scribner's, as were Hemingway and Fitzgerald. The point here is not that Scribner's was distinctively prejudiced against race (in 1926, for example, Cather's publisher, Knopf, brought out Frank H. Hankins' *The Racial Basis of Civilization* and Carl Van Vechten's *Nigger Heaven*), but rather that an interest in racial questions was not consigned to the margins of American intellectual life.

13 In fact, European immigration had already begun to be restricted by the immigration law of 1921 and, of course, Asian immigration had long been restricted both by act of Congress and by the gentlemen's agreement between Roosevelt and the government of Japan in 1908.

14 "If any gift of particular fitness, begged, unearned, lies anywhere in an individual or an association, it lies there, in the natural or ethnic group. That imparts to it its first impulsion, its characteristic skill, and its spontaneous direction. All else is acquired" (Kallen, 201). Kallen's identification of ethnic identity with nature suggests also the continuity between Faulkner's revision of the Hawthornian "hearts native tongue" and his deployment of that tongue through the increasingly "Negroid" speech of the Reverend Shegog. In neither Hawthorne nor Faulkner does the emergence of a "natural" language embody a true gesture toward universality, but where Dimesdale speaks to those whose common nature bespeaks a shared political identity, the Reverend Shegog speaks to those who share a common racial or ethnic identity.


17 Lothrop Stoddard, *Re-Forging America* (New York, 1927), 238. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text.

18 Thomas Dixon, *The Traitor* (New York, 1907), 328. *The Traitor* is the Tragedy's last volume; it was preceded by *The Leopard's Spots* (1902) and *The Clansman* (1905).


20 With respect to Jason, the point is only driven home by the fact that his Memphis girlfriend calls him "daddy" (117) and that he gives her money instead of paying her and by his inability to take the point of his own understanding of the meaning of money: "After all, like I say money has no value; it's just the way you spend it. It don't belong to anybody, so why try to hoard it" (117). The miser's transformation of the conventional value of money into the natural value of the hoard repeats the transformation of the prostitute into the daughter. And they call Benji "the natural" (97).

21 Gino Speranza, *Race or Nation* (Indianapolis, 1935), 103. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text.

22 In analogizing here the position of the African American to that of the Jew or Italian, I do not mean to suggest that their positions were, in fact, analogous. Indeed, in the Americanizing discourse of Progressive racism, their positions are almost diametrically opposed; the "Negro" defines the limits of Americanization. But it is an important feature of the nativist discourse of the '20s that the "New Negro" comes to be regarded as a national group like any other; this is one of the things that makes the "New Negro" new. And it is interesting to note that the recent recourse to the term "African American" explicitly redeploy the analogy between blacks and immigrant groups like the Jews and Italians.


26 From this standpoint, recent criticism of the anthropological ideology of culture and of cultural pluralism as "perpetuating" rather than, as was originally claimed, repudiating "hierarchies of differential value" seems to me to miss the point. Discussing what she describes as the Israeli "obsession with ethnicity," Virginia R. Dominguez persuasively argues that many supposedly "traditional" customs of non-European Israeli immigrants, while generally attributed to "their culture," are in fact a response to their "encounter with discrimination in Israel, the Israeli bureaucracy, and the material conditions of their lives in Israel" ("Involving Culture: The Messy Side of Cultural Politics," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 91:1, Winter 1992, 34). Her point here is that inherited differences in culture are invoked as an alibi for the perpetuation of social and economic inequalities; the difficulties that non-European Jews experience in Israeli society are attributed not to injustices in that society but to the immigrants' "culture." But she persistently misunderstands the force of her own point; what's wrong with the use of "culture" in Israel, she says, is that "Any positive reference to
culture almost always implies a European and Eurocentric culture which [the users] can claim as their own and in contrast to which they disparage others" (37). But the injustice in attributing the immigrants' difficulty in Israeli society to "their culture" is not that it devalues their culture but rather, as she herself has shown, that it falsely attributes to cultural inheritance differences that are in fact the product of economic inequality. And this false attribution is made possible by the pluralist commitment to regarding all cultures as equally valuable and therefore treating all cultural differences as worthy of respect. First, in other words, you identify a response to social injustice as a traditional cultural practice, then you value it (as opposed to altering both it and the conditions that in fact produced it) because it expresses the identity of the people whose practice it is. The problem with cultural pluralism, in other words, is not that it is insufficiently pluralistic and therefore serves only to mask a commitment to the superiority of European culture; the problem with it is that, insofar as it is genuinely pluralistic, it expresses a commitment to the irreversibility of cultural differences and therefore to their basis in race.

27 I characterize The Leopard's Spots and the other two novels in The Trilogy of Reconstruction (The Clansman [1905] and The Traitor [1907]) as anti-imperialist despite the fact that The Leopard's Spots describes the war in Cuba as a triumphant proclamation of "the advent of a giant democracy" (Dixon, The Leopard's Spots [New York, 1902], 407). (Subsequent references are to this edition and are cited in parentheses in the text.) The Congressional resolution under which the United States went to war with Spain had explicitly abjured "sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control" over Cuba and by 1902, the year in which The Leopard's Spots was published, the Platt Amendment had granted the Cubans complete independence. (For accounts of this process, see Ernest May, Imperial Democracy [New York, 1961], and Walter LaFeber, The New Empire [Ithaca, 1965].) Hence it was the invasion and annexation of the Philippines that served as the focus of American anti-imperialism—indeed, some anti-imperialists explicitly distinguished the "war for humanity against the Spanish in Cuba" from "the war for conquest against the Filipinos" (J. Laurence Laughlin speaking at the Chicago Liberty Meeting of April 30, 1899, reprinted in The Anti-Imperialist Reader, vol. 1, ed. Philip S. Foner and Richard C. Winchester [New York, 1984], 390–91)—and it is the arguments against annexation of the Philippines that I describe below as playing a central role in Dixon's novels. These arguments tended to take two forms: first, racist assertions that Filipino self-government was the only way to avoid burdening the United States with what Mrs. Jefferson Davis called "fresh millions of foreign negroes," even "more ignorant and more degraded" (in The Anti-Imperialist Reader, vol. 1, 236) than those at home, and, second, political appeals to the unconstitutional and, more generally, antirepublican character of imperial acquisition. These latter arguments were sometimes antiracist, but even when, as was more often the case, they displayed a certain amount of racial contempt for the Filipinos, that contempt was only incidental to the political point. If, then, anti-imperialist critiques were generally either racist or constitutional, one way of beginning to understand Dixon's contribution is by noting that in the trilogy, the racial and constitutional arguments against imperial conquest are not only understood as equally important but also (for reasons I give below) as inextricably linked.

28 Ernest Howard Crosby's Captain Jinks, Hero (1902; reprinted in The Anti-Imperialist Reader, vol. 2, ed. Philip S. Foner [New York, 1986], 367–394) is virtually the only anti-imperialist text I know that deals explicitly with the events in the Philippines, and Captain Jinks is more plausibly described as antimilitarist than as anti-imperialist since it is concerned primarily with burlesquing as a "peculiar kind of insanity" the "preoccupation with uniforms and soldiers, and the readiness [of Jinks] to do anything a man in regimentals tells him to" (393).


30 Edwin Burritt Smith, "Liberty or Despotism," in The Anti-Imperialist Reader, vol. 1, ed. by Foner and Winchester, 293.

31 The term "war of conquest" was employed so frequently in anti-imperialist descriptions of the invasion of the Philippines (by people like Bishop Spaulding and Carl Schurz as well as by the anonymous authors of the "Platform" quoted above) that it is difficult not to believe that Dixon intended his audience to hear their voices echoed in the voice of his Lincoln.

32 "We have come as a people to the parting of the ways. Which shall it be: Nation or Empire? . . . Let us look this imperialism squarely in the face and realize what it means. It means the surrender of American democracy. It means a menace to free American citizenship" (Liberty Tract No. 12 [1900], reprinted in Foner and Winchester, vol. 1, 306–7). This analysis of imperialism as a threat above all to self-government tends to be overlooked by those (like Lenin, for whom American anti-imperialists were "the last Mohicans of bourgeois democracy") who criticize what Robert L. Beisner has called the "impotence" of American anti-imperialists and who see them as essentially "conservative" (Beisner, Twelve Against Empire [Chicago, 1985], 222). If we understand American anti-imperialism as committed above all to the revisionary rescue of the concept of American citizenship described in this section, then we must also understand it to have been largely successful and, in its conceptual alliance with what Joel Williamson has called "radical" racism, hardly conservative.

33 Thomas Nelson Page, Red Rock (Ridgewood, New Jersey, 1967), viii. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text.

34 In his psychobiographical reading of The Leopard's Spots, Joel Williamson emphasizes "the affinity of Dixon for Dick" and, characterizing The Leopard's Spots as Dixon's attempt "to get right with womanhood generally and with his mother specifically," reads Dick's lynching as displaced punishment for Dixon's feelings of sexual guilt (Williamson, The Crucible of Race: Black-White Relations in the American South Since Emancipation [New York, 1984], 169). For Williamson, "Racism is essentially a mental condition, a disorder of the mind in which internal problems are projected upon external persons" (151), and The Leopard's Spots is thus of interest as evidence of how "the deeply personal and largely secret psychic needs of an individual might impel that person to extreme racism" (151). But, however implausible this reduction of racism to psychological abnormality (not to mention the even more blatant implausibility of the implication that late twentieth-century liberal views on race are evidence of psychological normalcy), Williamson's study of American racism since
the Civil War is an exceptionally insightful and powerful one, and has, particularly in its emphasis on and analysis of the rise of racial "radicalism," been crucial to my own understanding of the topic.

On the Klan's nationalism and, especially, on the use made of Dixon by D. W. Griffith in The Birth of a Nation, see Michael Rogin, "The Sword Became a Flashing Vision," in Ronald Reagan, The Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley, 1987), 190--235.

In fact, after winning the elections of 1894 and 1896, the fusionists were soundly defeated by the Democrats in 1898 and, after the disfranchisement of blacks in 1900, North Carolina followed Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina into the ranks of the solid Democratic South. Charles L. Flynn Jr. has recently argued that because the Southern Democracy (he is speaking of Georgia in particular but the argument can be generalized) was held together by "a conspiracy theory of national politics," Democrats were "unable to conceive of legitimate dissent outside of their party" ("Procrustean Bedfellows and Populists: An Alternative Hypothesis" in Race, Class and Politics in Southern History: Essays in Honor of Robert F. Durden, ed. Jeffrey J. Crow, Paul D. Escott, and Charles L. Flynn Jr. [Baton Rouge, 1989], 102). Emphasizing the similarity of populist and Democratic views in fundamental issues, his point is to revise C. Vann Woodward's account of the destruction of radical populism at the hands of conservative Democrats by suggesting that the ideological differences between the two groups were not as great as the more properly political ones; what the Democrats found most disturbing about the populists, in effect, was that they were not Democrats. And Flynn traces this nonideological loyalty to the Democratic Party back to the Reconstruction identification of Republicans as a "money aristocracy" out to plunder the South. His emphasis on the nonideological character of loyalty to the Democratic Party seems to me powerfully suggestive, but I would also argue that it is crucial not to think of this loyalty as simply the continuation of provincial or sectional paranoia. For Progressives (Southern and national), the one-party state could be understood less as a relic of Reconstruction than as a harbinger of the disappearance of partisan politics altogether and of their replacement by (as in Colonel House's Philip Dru, Administrator) the "commission"-run, administered state.


Describing a "typical entry" (from December 29, 1853) in the diary of one Duncan McCall of Jefferson County, Mississippi, Eugene D. Genovese writes, "He had, he recorded, killed a hog for his guests—Mr. Watson's family, black and white" (Roll, Jordan, Roll [New York, 1974], 73). Genovese's point is both that slave culture was shaped by a "special sense of family" that "brought black and white together" and that this same sense required not only slaves but also women and children "to accept subordination and obey the head of the white family" (74). It is noteworthy in this context that Progressive racism's critique of the family—its effort to replace family with race—was compatible with and often (as in the case of Ellen Glasgow) central to Progressive feminism's critique of the family, its effort to free wives and daughters from patriarchy.


It is worth noting that this commitment to the Constitution significantly distinguishes AmericanNegrophobia from the German anti-Semitism that was mobilized for Nazi totalitarianism. Totalitarianism's "defiance," as Arendt puts it, of "all, even its own, positive laws" (462) involved an indifference to constitutionalism so complete that, as Arendt points out, the Nazis never even bothered to revoke the Weimar Constitution. The political meaning of Dixon's Negrophobia, by contrast, is incomprehensible if separated from his identification of the law with the state.

This identification of anti-imperialism with a commitment to the racial state finds a powerful if indirect confirmation in another novel of 1905, Abraham Cahan's The White Terror and the Red (New York, 1905). The White Terror and the Red begins with a Russian prince disgusted by the "similarity in physical appearance" between "born aristocrats" and "untitled people" and wishing that "common people" were "black," like American "darkies," so that in Russia, as in "some countries," there would be "some difference between noble people and common" (10). In Cahan's Russia, there are no "darkies," of course, but the relation between the "question of race" and the "question of class" (386) is nonetheless central to the novel, which takes as its fundamental problem the position of Jews in the revolutionary party, the Will of the People. Thus, on the one hand, the party promises the elimination of racial differences; after the revolution "there won't be any such thing as a Jewish ... question" (141) and, in the meantime, the Russian prince turns revolutionary and even marries a Jewish girl. But, on the other hand, the party treats the great pogroms of 1881 as hopeful manifestations of revolutionary consciousness; when the prince sees the rioters in the streets, he thinks triumphantly, "So our people are not incapable of rising" (367), and when he sees the victims of the pogrom, "the panic-stricken men, women and children with oriental features" running past him, he is "simply" unable to "rouse himself to the sense of their being human creatures like himself" (367). The "oriental features" of the Jews fulfill the wish for a physical "difference" between the classes while at the same time, like Dick's lynching in The Leopard's Spots, offering the promise of a class-free society.

Nor is this ambivalence about class and race experienced only by the prince; both the Jews in the novel and the novel itself are absolutely unable to make up their minds about whether the solution to the "Jewish question" consists in the assertion through Jewish nationalism of Jewish racial identity or in the elimination through socialism of Jewish racial identity. Hence the relevance of America, which appears in the novel both as the exemplar of racial distinction and as a "shelter" (416) for Jews. In America, where the significant differences in "physical appearance" are, as the novel has begun by pointing out, between whites and "darkies," Jews can be nationalists and socialists at the same time. Thus, although those whom the novel calls the "Americans" (those who have decided to emigrate) are relatively minor figures in The White Terror and the Red, the novel is very much an American novel, written by an
"American" (Cahan emigrated in 1882 as a result of the pogroms) and depicting the Jewish experience in Russia as a rehearsal for American citizenship. Cahan's Jews get involved in anti-imperial politics out of their desire to be Russians: "When I think of the moments of joy the movement affords me," says a Talmud boy turned revolutionary, "of the ties of friendship with so many good people—the cream of the generation, the salt of the earth, the best children Russia ever gave birth to . . . I feel that I get a sort of happiness which no Rothschild could buy" (74). But anti-imperial politics in Russia, as in the United States, turns out to depend upon rather than repudiate racial difference. So Progressive America makes it possible for Jews to be revolutionaries by making it possible, as Dixon himself would suggest in his representation of the Jewish storekeeper in The Traitor, for Jews to be white. In America, the prince's desires for class equality and racial difference both can be fulfilled.

Mary Antin, The Promised Land (Princeton, 1985), 227. Subsequent references are cited in parentheses in the text.

Gatsby's "enabling act," as Herbert N. Schneider puts it in Waking Giants (New York, 1991), is "the creation of a new identity" that begins with the replacement of his actual family by something a good deal more glamorous: "In unrooted America, especially the West, the Family Romance becomes as valid as any other genealogy" (92). Waking Giants is a wonderfully insightful study of what Schneider calls "the presence of the past in Modernism" but one that, because of its relative indifference to the specifically genealogical nature of that presence, is relatively indifferent also to the nativist commitments embodied by those genealogies.

Insofar as the desire for a different future is the desire to belong to a different class, the desire for a different past that replaces it should be understood as the desire to belong to a different race. If, in other words, Progressive racism turned class difference between whites into racial identity, the new racism of the '20s turned class difference between whites into racial difference.

The ambiguity of Gatsby's background—the fact that what appear to be social conditions are presented by Fitzgerald as racial phenomena—is eliminated in The Sun Also Rises by making Cohn's class origins unproblematic, which is to say, by making his Jewishness the only relevant fact about him: where Gatsby needs to change his name to begin to count as a Jew, Cohn can be Jewish by leaving his alone. The closest The Sun Also Rises gets to the appearance of social class is the reflection—in relation to the Englishman Wilson-Harris—that "you couldn't tell how English would mix with each other" (130), and even this, as I show below, is eventually translated out of class into race.

Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (New York, 1969), 185.

The contrast with Nick, "growing up in the Carraway house in a city where dwellings are still called through decades by a family's name" (177), is especially sharp.


Madison Grant, introduction to Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color, xxx.

53 The rationale for this claim is provided in The Rising Tide in a long quotation from the racist writer Prescott Hall who, appealing to what he describes as a racial solution, insists that the "poorer" of two races "in the same place tends to suffer the better. Mark you, supplant, not drive out . . ." (357); some members of the superior race migrate, Hall says, "but most are prevented from coming into existence by the smallness of social sterilization and final replacement or absorption by the teeming colorless races" (398). Similar observations were commonplace. In America Comes of Age: A French Analysis (New York, 1927), for example, Andre Siegfried remarks that "certain classes of Americans" (he instance "intellectuals and university states"), "production seems almost to have ceased, and he cited "figures" published and quoted all over the country" showing that "On the basis of the present 1,000 Harvard graduates . . . will have only fifty descendants at the end of two centuries, whereas 1,000 Rumanians in Boston will have 150,000" (111).

54 Critics of The Professor's House tend either to ignore or play down the anti-Semitism, attacking it as "when they bring up an idea to the anti-Semitism about Isabelle McCullough's Jewish husband or to her general hostility to the pruriently material wealth" (David Stouck, Willa Cather's Image [Lincoln, Nebraska, 1975], 109). This seems to me a mistake but not entirely. It is mean to correct here since my own interest is less in anti-Semitism as such than in the role played by anti-Semitism (as by love of the classics and admiration for Indians) in the reconstruction of American citizenship.

The Johnson-Reed Act was anticipated by the Immigration Act of 1921 which, like its status as what John Higham calls "a makeshift designed to hold the gate while permanent plan was worked out," nevertheless "established the underlying principle of national quotas based on the preexisting composition of the American population" (Higham, Send These to Me [Baltimore, 1984], 54). The 1921 law created quotas based on the number of foreign-born Americans recorded in the 1910 census. The 1924 law used the 1890 census as a base and cut back the percentage of immigrants admitted from 3 to 2 percent of each nationality. It went on to provide that, at the request of the ancestry of the entire American population (the native-born as well as the foreign-born), immigration be limited to a total of 150,000, to be distributed among the various nationalities in proportion to their current representation in the American population. For a detailed discussion of the act of 1924, see John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick, 1988), 312-24.

The following citations are drawn from Francis Paul Prucha's compilation, Documents of United States Indian Policy (Lincoln, Neb., 1975).

57 In Zane Grey's The Rainbow Trail (New York, 1961) the Indian is called Nas Ta Be, and is based on a Sabatai named Nasja Begay who, with John Wetherill, guided an extended hunting expedition to the giant national arch Nonnezolhe and through Monument Valley in 1913 (41); it was Wetherill's brothers, Richard and Al, who in December 1888 had discovered the Anasazi ruins that they called Cliff Palace and that became Wetherill's Cliff City.

58 Frederick F. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians (Cranbridge, 1989), 236.