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Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
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University of Virginia Library, Call No. K 230 .C3N3

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Endnotes

Notes to Lecture I

[1] Cf. N. M. Butler, "Philosophy," pp. 18, 43.
[2] "Human Nature in Politics" p. 138.
[3] Sec. 370, p. 165.
[4] Cf. Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 226.
[5] "Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung," p. 72.
[6] "Science of Legal Method," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, pp. 4, 45, 65, 72, 124, 130, 159.
[7] Gény, "Methode d'Interpreétation et Sources en droit privé positif," vol. II, p. 180, sec. 176, ed. 1919; transl. 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 45.
[8] P. 65, supra; "Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series.
[9] Cf. Gnaeaus Flavius (Kantorowicz), "Der Kampf um Rechtswissenschaft," p. 48: "Von der Kultur des Richters hängt im letzten Grunde aller Fortschritt der Rechtsent wicklung ab."
[10] Gray, "Nature and Sources of the Law," sec. 395; Muirhead, "Roman Law " pp. 399, 400.
[11] Introduction to Gierke's "Political Theories of the Middle Age," p. viii.
[12] Saleilles, "De la Personnalit&eactue; Juridique," p. 45; Ehrlich, "Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts" pp. 34, 35; Pound, "Proceedings of American Bar Assn. 1919," p. 455
[13] "Essay on Judicature."
[14] Redlich, "The Case Method in American Lair Schools" Bulletin No. 8, Carnegie Foundation, p. 37.
[15] McDougall, "Social Psychology" p. 354; J. C. Gray, "Judicial Precedents," 9 Harvard L. R 27.
[16] Munroe Smith, "Jurisprudence," Columbia University Press, 1909, p. 21; cf. Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 7 Am. Pol. Science Rev. 361; 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 214; Pollock, "Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics," p. 246.
[17] Coolcy, "Torts," 1st ed., p. 93; Pollock, "Torts," 10th ed., p. 21.
[18] Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N.Y. 39; Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368.
[19] Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418; Aikens v. Wlsconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 204; Pollock, "Torts," supra.
[20] Arnold, "Essays in Criticism," second series, p. I.
[21] Holdsworth, "History of English Law," 2, p. 41; Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts," 7 Harvard L. R. 315, 383, 441; 3 Anglo-Am. Legal Essays 474; Smith, "Liability for Damage to Land," 33 Harvard L. R. 551; Ames, "Law and Morals," 22 Harvard L. R. 97, 99; Isaacs, "Fault and Liability," 31 Harvard L. R. 954.
[22] Cf. Duguit, "Les Transformations générales du droit privé depuis le Code Napoléon," Continental Legal Hist. Series, vol. XI, pp. 125, 126, secs. 40, 42.
[23] Holdsworth, supra, 2, p. 72; Ames, History of Parol Contracts prior to Assumpsit," 3 Anglo-Am. Legal Essays 304.
[24] Holdsworth, supra, 3, pp. 330, 336; Ames, "History of Assumpsit,"3 Anglo-Am. Legal Essays 275, 276.
[25] F. C. Montague in "A Sketch of Legal History," Maitland and Montague, p. 161.
[26] Cf. Bailhache, J., in Belfast Ropewalk Co. v. Bushell, 1918, 1 K. B. 210, 213: "Unfortunately or fortunately, I am not sure which, our law is not a science."
[27] "The Common Law," p. 1.
[28] W. G. Miller, "The Data of Jurisprudence," p. 335; cf. Gray, "Nature and Sources of the Law," sec. 420; Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 170.
[29] Cf. Gény, "Méthode d'Interprétation et Sources en droit privé positif," vol. II, p. 119.
[30]. W. G. Miller, supra p. 281; Bryce, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," vol. II, p. 629.
[31] P.I.
[32] Introduction to Hohfeld's Treatise by W. W. Cook.
[33] Professor Cook's Introduction.
[34] Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252, 254; 2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 962; N. Y. Personal Prop. Law, sec. 103a.
[35] Paine v. Meller,, 6 Ves. 349, 352; Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168; 2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 931.
[36] 2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 940.
[37] Cook, 29 Harvard L. R. 816, 836.
[38] Williston, 30 Harvard L. R. 97; 31 ibid. 822.
[39] Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 154; Ames, "Lectures on Legal History," pp. 313, 314.
[40] Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 386.
[41] Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., supra; Ames, supra.
[42] Jacobs & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239.
[43] Cf. Hynes v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (231 N. Y. 229, 235).
[44] "Notre droit public, comme notre droit privé, est un jus scriptum (Michoud, "La Responsibilité de l'état à raison des fautes de ses agents," Revue du droit public, 1895, P. 273, quoted by Gény, vol. I, p. 40, sec. 19).
[45] Op. cit., vol. I, p. 127, sec. 61.
[46] Ehrlich, "Die Juristische Logik," pp. 225, 227.
[47] Cf. Gény, opp. cit., vol. II, p. 121, sec. 165; also vol. I, p. 304, sec. 107.

Notes to Lecture II

[1] Cf. Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harvard L. R. 465.
[2] Bryce, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," vol. II, p. 609.
[3] "Collected Papers," vol. III, p. 438.
[4] Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 240.
[5] Holmes, J., in N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349.
[6] "Equity and Foms of Action," p. 296.
[7] "The Path of the Law," 10 Harvard L. R. 472.
[8] "Juristic Science and the Law," 31 Harvard L. R. 1047.
[9] Coke on Littleton, 62a; Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 440.
[10] Blackstone, Comm., pp. 67, 68; Gray, "Nature and Sources of the Law," p. 266, sec. 598; Sadler, "The Relation of Custom to Law," p. 59.
[11] Cf. Gray, supra, sec. 634; Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 143; Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 324, sec. III.
[12] "Common Law and Legislation," 21 Harvard L. R. 383, 406.
[13] Supra, sec. 634.
[14] Edelstein v. Schuler, 1902, 2 K. B. 144, 154; cf. Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank, 1898, 2 Q. B. 658.
[15] Cases, supra.
[16] Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; cf. Chase Nat. Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y. 532.
[17] Lewy v. Johnson, 2 Pet. 186.
[18] First Nat. Bank v. Farson, 226 N. Y. 218.
[19] Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 513; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464; 2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 649.
[20] Cf. Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 319, sec. 110.
[21] Dillon, "Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America," p. 19, quoted by Pound, 27 Harvard L. R. 731, 733.
[22] Printing etc. Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462, 46S.
[23] Cf. Brütt, supra, pp. 161, 163.
[24] Hobbes, vol. II, p. 264; quoted by W. G. Miller, "The Data of Jurisprudence," p. 399.
[25] Sir James Parke, afterward Lord Wensleydale, in Mirehouse v. Russell, I Cl. & F. 527, 546, quoted by Ehrlich, "Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts" [1913], p. 234; cf. Pollock, "Jurisprudence," p. 323.
[26] Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221.
[27] 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, pp. 159-163, 172-175; cf. Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," pp. 215, 216; Zitelmann, "Lücken im Recht," p. 23; Brütt, "Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung," p. 75; Stammler, "Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte," p. 271.
[28] Kiss, "Equity and Law," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 161.
[29] "Grundlegung der Soziologle des Rechts" [1913], p. 234.
[30] 19 L. Q. R. 15.
[31] Enzyklopadie, Bd. I, D. 10; Philosophy of Law, 12 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 58.
[32] Supra, p. 133, et seq.
[33] "System des Rechts und Wirthschaftsphilosophic." Bd. 3, L 28.
[34] Pound, "Administrative Application of Legal Standards," Proceedings American Bar Association, 1919, pp. 441, 449.
[35] Ibid., p. 451; cf. Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia L. R. 603.
[36] "Sociological Method," transl., 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 131.
[37] Gmelin, supra; cf. Ehrlich, "Die Juristische Logik," p. 187; Duguit, "Les Transformations du droit depuis le Code Napoléon," transl., Continental Legal Hist. Series, vol. XI, pp. 72, 70.
[38] Op. cit., vol. II, p. 92, sec. 159.
[39] Vol. II, p. 91.
[4O] Pound, "Juristic Science and the Law," 31 Harvard L. R. 1047, 1048.
[41] Cf. Duguit, supra.
[42] Haines, "The Law of Nature in Federal Decisions," 25 Yale L. J. 617.
[43] Hough, "Due Process of Law Today," 32 Harvard L. R. 218, 227.
[44] Cf. Hough, p. 232; also Frankfurter, "Const. Opinions of Holmes, J.," 29 Harvard L. R. 683, 687; Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," pp. 237, 239.
[45] 198 U. S. 75.
[46] P. 75.
[47] P. 76.
[48] Noble v. State Bank, 219 U. S. 104; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 360; Hall v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233; Frankfurter, supra.
[49] Burgess, "Reconciliation of Government and Liberty."
[50] Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590.
[51] People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131.
[52] People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395.
[53] Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412; Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 225; Pound, "Scope and Progress of Sociological Jurisprudence," 25 Harvard L. R. 513; cf. Brandeis, J., in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 600.
[54] U. S. Const., 14th Amendment.
[55] Holmes, J., dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 27.
[56] Montpellier, Coulet et fils, éditeurs, 1910.
[57] "There is now a tendency to consider no contract worthy of respect unless the parties to it are in relations, not only of liberty, but of equality. If one of the parties be without defense or resources, compelled to comply with the demands of the other, the result is a suppression of true freedom."--Charmont, supra, p. 172; transl. in 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 110, sec. 83.
[58] Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 386.
[59] Cf. Frankfurter, supra; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 407.
[60] Munroe Smith, "Jurisprudence," pp. 29, 30; cf. Vander Eycken, supra, pp. 383, 384; also Brütt, supra, p. 62.
[61] Kohler, "Interpretation of Law," transl. in 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, 192; cf. the Report of Prof. Huber on the German Code, quoted by Gény, "Technic of Codes," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 548; also Gény, "Méthode et Sources en droit privé positif," vol. I, p. 273.
[62] Munroe Smith, supra.
[63] Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
[64] German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389.
[65] German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, supra.
[66] American Coal Mining Co. v. Coal & Food Commission, U. S. District Court, Indiana, Sept. 6, 1920.
[67] L. 1920, chaps. 942 to 953.
[68] Since these lectures were written, the statutes have been sustained: People ex rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170.
[69] Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233.
[70] Transl., Continental Legal Hist. Series, vol. XI, p. 74, sec. 6, et seq.; for a more extreme view, see R. H. Tawney, "The Acquisitive Society."
[71] Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 608.
[72] The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589, 596.
[73] "Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung," p. 57.
[74] Missouri, K. & T. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270; People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 173.
[75] Cf. Collins, "The 14th Amendment and the States," pp. 158, 166.
[76] Learned Hand, "Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day," 21 Harvard L. R. 495, 508.
[77] Cf. Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," pp. 62, 63.
[78] Knowlton, J., in Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes, 171 Mass. 101, 104.
[79] Cf. Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," p. 39.

Notes to Lecture III

[1] Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233.
[2] Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44.
[3] Cf. Duguit, op. cit., Continental Legal Hist. Series, vol. XI, p. 120, sec. 36.
[4] Wood v. Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88.
[5] Kelso v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 536, 537; California Packing Co. v. Kelly S. & D. CO., 228 N. Y. 49.
[6] Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," 21 Harvard L. R. 383, 387.
[7] Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," p. 295; cf. pp. 294, 296.
[8] See his Treatise on Evidence, passim.
[9] Jhering, "Zweck im Recht," 5 Modern Legal Philosophy Series; also Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 8; Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 25 Harvard L. R. 140, 141, 145; Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia L. R. 603, 609.
[10] Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia L. R. 603, 609.
[11] Cf. Brütt, supra, pp. 161, 163.
[12] Saleilles, "De la Personnalité Juridique," p. 497. "Avec Jhering nous resterons des réalistes, mais avec lui aussi nous serons des idéalistes, attachés à l'idée de but et de finalité sociale."--Saleilles, p. 516.
[13] Cf. Ehrlich, "Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts," pp. 366, 368; Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 212; Gray, "Nature and Sources of Law," secs. 628, 650; Vinogradoff, "Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence," p. 135.
[14] Ehrlich, supra.
[15] Cf. Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 263, sec. 92.
[16] For a clear and interesting summary, see Brütt, supra, p. 101, et seq.; cf. Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 221; and contrast Flavius, op. cit., p. 87.
[17] Brütt, supra, pp. 101-111.
[18] Stammler, "Richtiges Recht," s. 162, quoted by Brütt, supra, p. 104.
[19] "Nature and Sources of Law," sec. 610.
[20] Supra, p. 139
[21] Barnes, "Durkheim's Political Theory," 35 Pol. Science Quarterly, p. 239.
[22] Ibid.; cf. Barker, "Political Thought from Spencer to Today," pp. 151, 153, 175.
[23] Vander Eycken, "Méthode Positive de l'Interprétation juridique," p. 59; Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," p. 187.
[24] "La Renaissance du droit naturel," p. 181.
[25] "He may intervene only to supplement the formal authorities, and even in that field there are limits to his discretion in establishing rules of law. He may neither restrict the scope of the general principles of our juridical organization, explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, nor may he lay down detailed regulations governing the exercise of given rights, by introducing delays, formalities, or rules of publicity."--Charmont, supra, transl. in 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 120, sec. 91. Cf. Jhering, "Law as a Means to an End" (5 Modern Legal Philosophy Series: Introduction by W. M. Geldart, p. xlvi): "The purposes of law are embodied in legal conceptions which must develop in independence and cannot at every step be called upon to conform to particular needs. Otherwise system and certainty would be unattainable. But this autonomy of law, if it were only because of excess or defects of logic, will lead to a divergence between law and the needs of life, which from time to time calls for correction. . . . How far if at all the needful changes can or ought to be carried out by judicial decisions or the development of legal theory, and how far the intervention of the legislator will be called for, is a matter that will vary from one legal territory to another according to the accepted traditions as to the binding force of precedents, the character of the enacted law, and the wider or narrower liberty of judicial interpretation."
[26] Cf. Berolzheimer, 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, pp. 167, 168.
[27] Flavius, supra, p. 49; 2 Pollock and Maitland, "History of English Law," p. 561.
[28] Smith, "Surviving Fictions," 27 Yale L. J., 147, 317; Ehrlich, supra, pp. 227, 228; Saleilles, "De la Pérsonnalité Juridique," p. 382.

"Lorsque la loi sanctionne certains rapports juridiques, à l'exclusion de tels autres qui en différent, il arrive, pour tels ou tels rapports de droit plus ou moins similaires auxquels on sent le besoin d'étendre la protection légale, que l'on est tenté de procéder, soit par analogie, soit par fiction. La fiction est une analogie un peu amplifiée, ou plutôt non dissimulée."--Saleilles, supra.
[29] "The Path of the Law," 10 Harvard L. R. 466.
[30] Op. cit., vol. II, p. 77.
[31] Ehrlich has the same thought, "Die juristische Logik," p. 312.
[32] Professor in the University of Brussels.
[33] P. 401, sec. 239.
[34] On this subject, see Sherman, "Roman Law in the Modern World"; Scrutton, "Roman Law Influence," I Select Essays in Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. 208.
[35] Pollock and Maitland's "History of English Law," 88, 114; Maitland's "Introduction to Gierke," supra, p. xii.
[36] Cf. Pound, 27 Harvard L. R. 731, 733.
[37] Austin, "Jurisprudence," vol. I, 37, 104; Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 54; W. Jethro Brown, "The Austinian Theory of Law," p. 311.
[38] Sec. 602.
[39] Cf. Gray, supra, secs. 276, 366, 369.
[40] 29 Yale L. J. 394.
[41] Cf. Beale, "Conflict of Laws," p. 153, sec. 129.
[42] Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 157; Sadler, "Relation of Law to Custom," pp. 4, 6, 50; F. A. Geer, 9 L. Q. R. 153.
[43] Duguit, "Law and the State," 31 Harvard L. R. I; Vinogradoff, "The Crisis of Modern Jurisprudence," 29 Yale L. J. 312; Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," pp. 41, 42.
[44] ""Law is the body of general principles and of particular rules in accordance with which civil rights are created and regulated, and wrongs prevented or redressed" (Beale, "Conffict of Laws," p. 132, sec. 114).
[45] Salmond, "The Law of Nature," II L Q. R 121; Pollock, "The History of the Law of Nature," I Columbia L. R. II; 2 Lowell, "The Government of England, 477, 478; Maitland's "Collected Papers," p. 23.
[46] Cf. Ritchie, "Natural Rights."
[47] Pound, 25 Harvard L. R. 162; Charmont, "La Renaissance du droit naturel," passim; also transl., 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, pp. 106, III; Demogue, "Analysis of Fundamental Notions," 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 373, sec. 212; Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," p. 64.
[48] Vander Eycken, op. cit., p. 401.
[49] Berolzheimer, "System der Rechts und Wirthschaftsphilosophie," Vol. II, 27, quoted by Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 24 Harvard L. R. 607; also Isaacs, "The Schools of Jurisprudence," 31 Harvard L. R. 373, 389; and for the mediaeval view, Maitland's "Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age," pp. 75, 84, 93, 173.
[50] Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 54.
[51] See Gray, supra, p. 286, secs. 644, 645.
[52] Art. 4; Gray, supra, sec. 642; Gény, op. cit., vol. II, p. 75, sec. 155; Gnaeus Flavius, "Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft," p. 14.
[53] "The judge who shall refuse to give judgment under pretext of the silence, of the obscurity, or of the inadequacy of the law, shall be subject to prosecution as guilty of a denial of justice."
[54] Arthur L. Corbin, 29 Yale L. J. 771.
[55] Cf. Standard Chemical Corp. v. Waugh Corp., 231 N.Y. 51, 55.
[56] Flavius, "Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft," pp. 48, 49; Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," pp. 291, 292.
[57] Gény, op. cit., ed. of 1919, vol. II, p. 288, sec. 196; p. 305, sec. 200.
[58] Bruce, "Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and Other States," 88 Central L. J. 136; Judge Robinson's Reply, 88 ibid. 155; "Rule and Discretion in the Administration of Justice," 33 Harvard L. R. 792.
[59] Gény, op. cit., ed. of 1919, vol. II, p. 287, sec. 196, et seq.
[60] Salmond, "Jurisprudence," pp. 19, 20.
[61] Gény, op. cit., II, p. 213; also Perick, "The Swiss Code," XI, Continental Legal Hist. Series, p. 238, sec. 5.
[62] Gény, op. cit., II, p. 303, sec. 200.

Notes to Lecture IV

[1] Op. cit., Preface, p. xvi.
[2] Pollack, "Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics; The Science of Case Law," p. 241.
[3] MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382.
[4] Harris v. Jex, 55 N. Y. 421; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 125; Holmes, J., in Kuln v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 371; 29 Harvard L. R. 80, 1O3; Danchey Co. v. Farmy, 105 Misc. 470; Freeman, "Retroactive Operation of Decisions," 18 Columbia L. R. p. 230; Gray, supra, secs. 547, 548; Carpenter, "Court Decisions and the Common Law," 17 Columbia L. R. 593.
[5] Evans v. Supreme Council, 223 N. Y. 497, 503.
[6] Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677.
[7] Cf. Wigmore, "The Judicial Function," Preface to 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, pp. xxxvii, xxxviii.
[8] Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," pp. 70, 71; Green, "Separation of Governmental Powers," 29 Yale L. J. 371.
[9] "Rule and Discretion in the Administration of Justice," 33 Harvard L. R., 972; 29 Yale L. J. 909; 34 Harvard L. R. 74; 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Preface, p. xxxvi.
[10] Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383.
[11] N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 178 N. Y. 381.
[12] Wilkinson v. McKemmie, 229 U. S. 590, 593; U. S. v. McMullen, 222 U. S. 460, 468; Richardson v. County of Steuben, 226 N. Y. 13; Assets Realization Co. v. Roth, 226 N. Y. 370.
[13] McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1; 3 Williston on Contracts, secs. 1835, 1836.
[14] Harris v. Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343.
[15] McCreery v. Day, supra; Thomson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402.
[16] Harris v. Shorall, supra.
[17] People v. Carey, 223 N. Y. 519.
[18] Gray, supra, sec. 462; Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 164, sec. 64; Pound, "Juristic Science and the Law," 31 Harvard L. R. 1053; London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council, 1898, A. C. 375, 379.
[19] Pollock, "First Book of Jurisprudence," pp. 319, 320; Gray, "Judicial Precedents," 9 Harvard L. R. 27, 40.
[20] "Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics" p. 245.
[21] Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co., 261 Fed. Rep. 878.
[22] 221 Fed. Rep. 801.
[23] MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO., 217 N. Y. 382.
[24] 29 Yale L. J. 394, 397.
[25] Cf. Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 160.
[26] G. Lowes Dickinson, "Religion and Immortality," p. 70.
[27] An interesting study of this subject will be found in a book published since these lectures were written "The Foundations of Social Science," by James Mickel Williams, p. 209 et seq.
[28] Montesquieu, "Esprit des Lois," LIV, XI, chap. VI, quoted by Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," p.101; Gény, op. cit., p. 76; cf. Flavius, supra, p. 40.
[29] pp. 45, 46.
[30] 43 Congressional Record, part 1, p. 21.
[31] Gény, op. cit., vol. II, p. 93, sec. 159; vol II, p. 142, sec. 168; also Flavius, p. 43.
[32] "The Still Small Voice of the Herd," 32 Political Science Quarterly 315.
[33] Henry Adams, "The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma," pp. 291, 292.
[34] "Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law," p. 164; cf. Powell, "The Changing Law of Foreign Corporations," 33 Pol. Science Quarterly, p. 569.


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