Labor
Boards: The New Mechanism for Industrial Relations
by John A. Fitch
Director of Industrial Courses, New York School of Social Work
November 1934
The National Labor Board was
created by the President on August 5, 1933, at the joint request
of both the Labor and the Industrial Advisory Boards of the
NRA. This Board of seven, made up of three members of each of
the two advisory boards (industrial and labor) with Senator
Wagner as chairman, was limited at the outset to cases of "hardship
or dispute that may arise from interpretation or application
of the President's Re-employment Agreement." It was looked upon,
however, and soon came to be used as a general mediation board
functioning widely in industry.
This
Board broke new ground. It did a vast amount of work and in
its decisions made a significant contribution to orderly processes
in industrial relations and to the enforcement of Section 7-a
of the Recovery Act. But it operated under three major handicaps.
In
the first place, its powers were uncertain, because it existed
solely as the result of a somewhat informal invitation from
the President, made without reference to any statutory authority.
In December 1933 and in February 1934 the President issued executive
orders on the authority of the Recovery Act, enlarging the scope
of the Board and giving it definite powers. Specifically, it
was empowered to mediate in all labor controversies tending
to "impede the purposes of the Recovery Act," to arbitrate cases
submitted to it, to organize regional labor boards and to review
their findings, and after February 1, 1934, to conduct elections
to determine the will of employes in particular establishments
for collective bargaining. These formal orders strengthened
the Board's position, but there continued to be some doubt about
its legal status.
In
the second place, its jurisdiction as distinct from that of
the Recovery Administration was somewhat uncertain. There was
nothing to prevent the NRA from appearing suddenly in a labor
case to supplant the Labor Board. A notable case in point was
the threatened automobile strike in March 1934. The National
Labor Board asked the disputants to come to Washington for a
hearing. Just before the hearing was to begin, General Johnson,
according to authoritative sources in Washington, summoned the
manufacturers to his office and discussed terms of settlement.
The manufacturers then went before the Labor Board and stated
their case, after which, accompanied by some of the employer-members
of the Board they returned to General Johnson's office where
negotiations were continued until the settlement, later promulgated,
was agreed upon. The Labor Board, although it held a hearing,
never made a finding in this case. The text of this agreement
when finally perfected contained the clause providing for proportional
representation, referred to above.
A
threat to the independence of the Board appeared also in a provision
that crept, inadvertently, into the President's order of February
1. It provided that cases of violation of Section 7-a, not adjusted
by the Board should be referred to the administrator for Industrial
Recovery for "appropriate action." Three weeks later this provision
was withdrawn and a new one inserted authorizing reference of
cases to the attorney general or to the Compliance Division
of the NRA, which was to take "appropriate action" but not to
review the findings of the Board.
The
third handicap confronting the Board was its heavily burdened
personnel. Besides its chairman who was one of the most active
members of the Senate, it consisted of six exceptionally busy
men who, in addition to holding important positions in their
respective fields, also had other obligations in the NRA itself.
Consequently it was ofien very difficult to obtain a quorum.
The second important agency to be set up during the experimental
period was the Cotton Textile Industrial Relations Board, commonly
known as the Bruere Board, created on August 8, 1933. This Board
also had its handicaps, some of which are well known. They appear
to have arisen out of its form of organization and the peculiar
problems existing in the cotton-textile industry. Unlike most
of the other boards, the Bruere Board was outlined and its powers
specified in the Cotton Code itself. Thus, while in a sense
under the jurisdiction of the NRA it was more closely tied up
to the Code Authority than to any other agency. It was limited
both in funds and in staff. Consequently many complaints addressed
to it had to be turned over to the Code Authority, made up of
employers, for investigation by their staff. Moreover, the industry
is one of vast extent, employing nearly half a million workers,
less than twenty thousand of whom at the time of the organization
of the Board were members of the United Textile Workers or of
any other union. Under all of these circumstances it was more
or less inevitable that when a widespread movement for organization
got under way there should be a tendency to upset the applecart.
THE Board consisted of a representative of employers, a labor
representative who because of the initial weakness of the Textile
Workers Union was chosen from another field, and a chairman
of exceptional experience and ability in the handling of industrial
relations. It was a Board committed to action upon the basis
of ascertained facts developed through research. Its members
knew that changes in the set-up were necessary and steps in
that direction were under way when the strike intervened and
the Board ceased to function. If conditions in the industry
had been different it seems probable that the Board would have
worked its way out of its difficulties. But the situation required
quick action and the Board was deliberate. Its elimination was
necessary because it had lost the support of labor. It is only
fair to say, however, that the official change of front on the
part of the union was a sharp break with its previous position.
Comment in the official journal had been favorable and as late
as June 28, Vice-president Francis Gorman, the leader of the
textile strike, accepted membership on a new board for wool
and silk under Mr. Bruere's chairmanship.
The problems that emerged in
the cotton-textile industry are duplicated in part by the situation
in the automobile industry, although the Automobile Labor Board
was set up under very different conditions. This Board is neither
under the Code Authority nor the NRA but is responsible directly
to the President. It was created in accordance with the terms
of the agreement of March 27 by which the threatened strike
in the industry was averted (see Survey Graphic, May 1934, page
213). Its authority is limited to the discovery of the will
of the employes with respect to representation and the adjustment
of disputes with respect to discriminatory discharge. By agreement
between the parties it has final authority with respect to these
matters.
This agreement was, as previously
stated, arrived at by conference between the Recovery Administration
and the employers, with representatives of labor not participating
to any great extent. Both for this reason and on account of
the proportional-representation clause organized labor was dissatisfied
with it at the outset and is still dissatisfied, since it feels
that the decisions of the Board have been neither prompt nor
vigorous.
The extent to which this feeling
is justified depends upon facts and circumstances that could
only be definitely established by investigation on the ground.
But here is another industry which was almost wholly without
organization a year ago. There has been a mushroom growth of
trade unionism in this field but the situation is so unstable
that the member of the Board representing labor is no longer
representative of the majority of organized workers.
The only one of the labor boards appointed during this experimental
period which has won the confidence of both employers and workers
is the Petroleum Labor Policies Board created by the secretary
of the interior as administrator of the Petroleum Code. Yet
its creation was due, in part at least, to an accident. In November,
Secretary Ickes had appointed a three-party Board. It happened
that one of the three labor members of this Board was a representative
of a company union, and the other two, representing an AFL union,
refused to sit on the Board with him. Accordingly this Board
never functioned and on December 22, 1933, the secretary abolished
it and created a new Board of three, having no connection either
with the industry or with labor. This Board was made up of exceptionally
able men with long experience in industrial relations and it
dealt vigorously and realistically with the situation before
it.
The
second period of governmental activity in the creation of labor
adjustment boards may be said to have been initiated by Senator
Wagner. Because of what he had learned as chairman of the National
Labor Board he introduced last winter his labor-disputes bill,
defining with particularity the employer's duties as to collective
bargaining, banning company unions and creating a labor adjustment
board. This bill failed of passage. In its stead Congress passed
Public Resolution No. 44 which was signed by the President on
June 19. This authorized the President to create boards to investigate
controversies arising under 7-a or which are in danger of affecting
interstate commerce. Such boards were authorized to conduct
elections to determine representation, and were given power
to subpoena witnesses and documents.
The
first to be set up under this act was the Longshoremen's Board
created to arbitrate the questions involved in the San Francisco
strike. The second was the Steel Labor Relations Board appointed
onJune 28 to deal with matters involved in the threatened strike
in that industry. The third was the National Labor Relations
Board created by executive order on June 29, and the fourth
was the new Textile Board appointed in accordance with the recommendation
of the Winant Committee Report which ended the textile strike.
In all four cases, though the law does not require it, the President
followed the practice of selecting non-partisan representatives
of the public. The period of boards representing interests appears
to be definitely over. In every case the President has chosen
men of exceptional qualifications for this type of work.
